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Abstract 
Both giving and receiving money have emotional benefits, but when gifts of value are made in 
the context of socioeconomic differences, there might also be emotional costs. Four studies (and 
an internal meta-analysis) tested the idea that receiving a generous gift from someone higher in 
perceived socioeconomic status (SES) signals social identity threat. In Study 1 (N = 218), 
participants on average, but especially those with relatively lower SES, reported experiencing 
more self-conscious negative affect when receiving a generous amount of money (vs. an even 
split) from a higher status giver in a dictator game. This effect was mediated by feeling pitied by 
the giver. Studies 2 (N = 331) and 3 (N = 426) revealed similar effects with recalled real-world 
experiences of receiving a generous gift from higher SES givers. Studies 3 and 4 (N = 142) 
revealed evidence for serial mediation, with lower relative SES predicting status awareness, 
status awareness predicting attributions of pity, and attributions of pity in turn predicting self-
conscious negative affect. Effects were not significantly moderated by needing or requesting the 
money, suggesting that acts of generosity across the status divide readily signal social 
devaluation for those with lower perceived status. Findings have practical and conceptual 
implications for prosocial giving in a system of social and economic inequality. 
Keywords: social identity threat, prosocial behavior, socioeconomic status, self-conscious 
emotion, attributions 
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Income inequality in the U.S. recently reached its highest level since the Great 
Depression (Saez & Zucman, 2016), and even those who have quite fiscally conservative views 
believe that current levels of inequality should be reduced (Norton & Ariely, 2011). 
Redistribution of resources from those who have to those who have not is one way to balance 
inequality. In interpersonal contexts, individuals who have more resources may feel a desire to 
share some of their wealth with those who have less, perhaps motivated by a sense of fairness 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). However, aspects of the 
psychology of status differences are likely to influence how those in need feel about receiving 
generous gifts from those with higher status (Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher-Alagna, 1982; Nadler 
& Fisher, 1986; Nadler & Halabi, 2015). In the current research, we investigated the affective 
consequences experienced by someone of lower socioeconomic status (SES) when they receive a 
generous gift from someone of relatively higher SES. Four studies test the idea that being the 
target of generosity elicits social identity threat for those with relatively lower SES than the 
giver, making them feel pitied and self-conscious and, as a result, disrupting the hedonic benefits 
that normally come from receiving gifts.  
An identity threat perspective contrasts with a rational approach to understanding the 
experience of receiving gifts. From a rational perspective, money is inherently rewarding and 
thus people typically feel good about receiving money and feel better the more they receive 
(Thut et al., 1997). In addition, acts of generosity are generally perceived positively (Barclay, 
2010), and can have affective benefits for the givers, who typically feel good about helping 
others in need (Aknin, Dunn, Sandstrom, & Norton, 2013; Aknin, Dunn, Whillans, Grant, & 
Norton, 2013; Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008). This rational perspective on generosity, however, 
fails to take into account the broader meaning that prosocial acts have within a social context.  
SES AND HELPING  5 
Our goal in the current research was, specifically, to understand the affective reactions to 
generous gifts of monetary value (defined as reactions to receiving more than would be expected 
given the prevalent norms for a situation) that might otherwise inspire only happiness and 
gratitude. We examine this question primarily from a social identity threat perspective (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002), and use this approach to extend prior theory 
and evidence on other threat-based models of helping (Fisher et al., 1982; Nadler, 2002; Nadler 
& Fisher, 1986; Nadler & Halabi, 2015). As we will discuss, these threat-based approaches point 
to the ways in which receiving aid from people higher in status can unintentionally signal and 
reinforce existing social hierarchies, disrupting the hedonic benefits that would rationally be 
expected upon receiving a generous gift. 
SES as a Source of Social Identity Threat 
The feeling of being socially devalued in the broader society, by virtue of some attribute 
or shared group membership, is encompassed by the term social identity threat (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Social identity threat is most often studied in terms of 
definable social groups based on gender, race, and ethnicity. SES also holds the potential to elicit 
social identity threat, because a person’s social class and socioeconomic status are important 
sources of personal identity (Stephens et al., 2012). However, in contrast to consensually held 
social categories with clearly defined boundaries (e.g., gender, race, and ethnicity), one’s SES is 
perceived as a malleable individual-level characteristic and people sustain the hope that their 
status can be increased in a meritocratic system (Major & Townsend, 2010). But regardless of 
the perceived malleability of SES, real-time instances of SES-based threats are likely to function 
similarly to other social identity threats. Drawing from a multi-threat framework (Shapiro & 
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Neuberg, 2007), reminders of lower SES are then likely to be experienced as a threat of being 
personally devalued in the eyes of those with higher status. 
One’s own perception of one’s SES is to a large extent subjective, and shaped through 
processes of social comparison (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Sweeney, McFarlin, & Inderrieden, 1990). 
For example, only 12% of Americans surveyed describe themselves as being upper or upper-
middle class, even though 40% would receive this designation based on their objective income 
levels (Pew Research Center, 2015).1 Thus, even those who are objectively more affluent often 
feel that they have subjectively lower status than their peers. For example, in an elite university 
setting, middle-class students experience social identity threat when comparing themselves to 
students from more economically privileged backgrounds, and these feelings of threat predict a 
reduced sense of academic belonging and self-efficacy (Johnson, Richeson, & Finkel, 2011; 
Walton & Cohen, 2007). In other research, situational reminders of having relatively lower SES 
can induce threat and impair cognitive performance (Croizet & Millet, 2012; John-Henderson, 
Rheinschmidt, Mendoza-Denton, & Francis, 2014; Régner, Huguet, & Monteil, 2002; Stephens, 
Markus, & Fryberg, 2012). Recent research also indicates that people perceive others’ SES 
automatically (Kraus, Park, & Tan, 2017), suggesting that people can be quite sensitive to 
detecting SES differences between themselves and others. 
Despite the salience of SES as a function of social comparison, and the motivations for 
those with greater economic resources to give generously to those with less, research has not 
examined real instances of prosocial generosity through the lens of social identity threat theory. 
In addition to genuine prosocial motivations, individuals or groups with higher SES might help 
those with lower SES because they are motivated to bolster their own reputation, assert their 
control, follow prevalent norms, or assuage their guilt (Nadler & Halabi, 2015). However, given 
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these social psychological motivations for those higher in SES to share their resources, lower 
SES targets of generosity might see such acts as a signal of the ways in which their social 
identity has lower status (Fisher et al., 1982; Nadler & Fisher, 1986). Thus, we sought to test the 
hypothesis that in instances of generous giving, cues of status differences might prevent lower 
SES recipients from enjoying the hedonic benefits of generosity, even as they acknowledge the 
good intentions of the giver. 
Reactions to Assumptive Help 
Our general hypothesis, that there can be hedonic costs to receiving help from someone 
higher in status, aligns with past theory on targets’ reactions to aid (Fisher et al., 1982; Nadler & 
Fisher, 1986 for reviews). Of greatest relevance is research on assumptive help, which suggests 
that people experience reduced self-esteem when they are recipients of unsolicited task-specific 
help from more advantaged others (Fisher et al., 1982; Nadler & Fisher, 1986; Nadler & Halabi, 
2015). Such effects have been found for a Black student receiving academic help from a White 
student (Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, & Crocker, 1996), a physically disabled person receiving 
instrumental help from their spouse (Newsom & Schulz, 1998), and a person with fewer tokens 
receiving help from a person with more tokens in a mock investment game (Fisher & Nadler, 
1976). To our knowledge, prior research in this literature has not specifically investigated SES as 
a source of a giver’s higher status. 
Nonetheless, research in this literature on targets’ reactions to aid suggests that 
individuals show lower self-esteem when unsolicited help on a task signals an assumption that 
they cannot complete a task independently (e.g., Halabi, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2011). Such effects 
are stronger when help is given in a performance domain that is ego-defining to the target 
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(Nadler, 1987; Nadler, Fisher, & Ben-Itzhak, 1983), and comes from a donor who otherwise 
seems to have similar attitudes and is thus a salient source of social comparison (Fisher, 
Harrison, & Nadler, 1978; Fisher & Nadler, 1974; Nadler, Fisher, & Streufert, 1976). According 
to this self-esteem threat view, the upward social comparison to advantaged others (or groups) 
triggers negative self-evaluations, resentment toward the giver, and feelings of dependency. 
Lower Status Targets’ Reactions to Generosity 
Given this prior theory and evidence, we similarly assumed that acts of financial 
generosity, when carried out in the context of salient SES differences between the giver and the 
recipient, would not be perceived as purely positive events. However, there are also important 
ways in which gifts of monetary value could be theoretically distinct from the task-focused help 
that has been traditionally studied in this past literature. Most notably, the fungible nature of 
money makes it less clear whether generous gifts are dependency-oriented (and thus threatening) 
or autonomy-supportive (and thus non-threatening) according to threat-based models of helping 
(Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2015).  
In addition, the uncertainty of a giver’s motives might exacerbate attributional ambiguity 
(Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991). While most, if not all, individuals might experience 
this attributional ambiguity upon being the recipient of an unexpectedly generous gift, when aid 
is given in the context of a salient status difference, we expect that the lower status recipient will 
be more likely to experience social identity threat. That is, they will experience the giver’s 
generosity as a signal of their lower status and as motivated by pity, rather than simply by 
generosity or fairness. Furthermore, we hypothesized that interpreting acts of generosity as 
motivated by pity would predict the experience of self-conscious negative emotions, such as 
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shame and humiliation (Nadler & Halabi, 2015). These emotions serve as an affective signal of 
one’s lower status within a broader social hierarchy (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Keltner & Haidt, 
1999) and have been linked to the experience of social identity threat in past research (Schmader, 
Block, & Lickel, 2015). 
These predictions were informed by, but are conceptually distinct from, threat-based 
models of targets’ reactions to help. First, threat-based models have largely focused on how 
being the target of dependency-oriented help triggers self-threatening upward social comparisons 
to the giver, and becomes internalized into one’s self-evaluation, manifesting as lower self-
esteem. Because it was not clear to us that generous gifts necessarily signal a strong sense of 
dependency versus autonomy, we did not identify general self-esteem as our primary outcome of 
interest. From a social identity threat perspective, contextual reminders of social devaluation are 
not always internalized in ways that reduce self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989). And yet subtle 
social cues that make status differences salient can still signal identity-based devaluation and 
carry emotional costs that, when accumulated over time, can be detrimental to health and well-
being (Major & Schmader, 2018). Thus, after isolating key effects of generosity on affective 
responses in Studies 1 and 2, Studies 3 and 4 aimed to assess the degree to which acts of 
generosity from higher status givers trigger a salience of one’s lower status in ways that are 
distinct from feeling relatively incompetent (a threat to competence self-esteem) or socially 
rejected (a threat to social self-esteem).   
A second conceptual advance from the prior threat-based research on reactions to aid is to 
assess negative self-conscious emotions and positive emotions on separate scales to better assess 
the mixed emotions one might experience in these situations. Past research on reactions to help 
has typically assessed a general affective reaction rather than specifically assessing self-
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conscious emotions as distinct from a positive affective response. We expected that being a 
target of generosity from a higher status giver would elicit self-conscious emotions that taint the 
affective experience, even if one appreciates and is grateful for the gift. 
We tested these core hypotheses in a series of experimental and narrative-recall studies 
that focus on real experiences of receiving generous gifts from higher status others. The only 
prior study to specifically examine targets’ reactions to receiving resources from a higher status 
giver was a clever experiment conducted over 40 years ago by Fisher and Nadler (1976) using a 
token investment game. In this study, people with only a few remaining tokens reported lower 
self-esteem (operationalized as lower intelligence and self-confidence) and self-evaluations 
(operationalized as less nice, good and bright) after receiving aid from a participant with many 
more tokens, compared to receiving aid from a similarly disadvantaged participant. This finding 
informed the predictions made here, but the current set of studies aimed to test our social identity 
threat approach to this phenomenon by making several important ecological and methodological 
advances over this earlier work.  
First, this earlier study (and many other similar studies carried out during this time) 
included fewer than 20 participants per condition and interpreted non-significant pairwise 
comparisons as effects. Given current concerns about replicability in science, we felt it was 
important to carry out more highly powered tests of our hypotheses that are also informed by 
contemporary research on social identity threat. Second, instead of creating a situational 
indicator of status by manipulating resource differences within a token economy game, we 
examined participants’ perceptions of their actual SES relative to a real donor, and reactions to 
gifts of real money or value, which should elicit more authentic social identity threat and 
negative affect, given the real-world relevance to people’s lived experiences. Finally, we sought 
SES AND HELPING  11 
to establish the reliability of the core predicted effects using a multi-method approach that 
combined both controlled laboratory experiments using a dictator game paradigm, and narrative-
recall methods that sampled a broader range of real-world experiences. Together, the present 
studies represent a more realistic test of the affective consequences of receiving generosity from 
relatively higher status others in an era of extreme income inequality. 
Current Research 
 We tested our hypotheses across four studies that used a mix of experimental (Studies 1 
and 4) and survey-based methods that sampled people’s real-life experiences (Studies 2 and 3). 
Because some effects vary from study to study, we also included an internal meta-analysis to 
provide a more precise estimate of effect sizes. We report all measures, manipulations, and 
exclusions in these studies, either in the main text or in the Supplementary Materials (SOM). 
Sample sizes for all studies were determined before any data analysis. Materials, data sets and 
analysis scripts for all studies are available online: https://osf.io/yh7wu/. 
In Study 1, university student participants received either a generous ($8 out of $10) or 
equitable ($5) amount of money in a dictator game from a confederate who was portrayed as 
being higher than or similar in SES to the participant. We hypothesized an interaction effect 
whereby participants would feel the most self-conscious negative affect (and perhaps less 
positive affect) when they received a surprisingly generous amount from a higher status giver. In 
Studies 2 and 3, adults recalled and rated a personal experience of receiving a generous gift in 
the past. Because we focused specifically on self-identified acts of generosity (analogous to 
looking at only the $8 condition in Study 1), we hypothesized a main effect of participants’ self-
reported SES relative to the giver as a predictor of greater attributions to pity and more negative 
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affective reactions. By sampling a broad range of people’s lived experiences as recipients of 
generosity in Studies 2 and 3, we also tested whether effects were moderated by factors such as 
needing the money, having requested the money, the receiver’s relationship with the giver, and 
whether or not the gift was exchanged in person. In Study 4, we used the same experimental 
method as in Study 1 to test whether the effect is reduced, if not eliminated, when SES 
differences are not made salient to the recipient. Across the set of studies, we tested indirect 
effects, whereby the affective reactions to receiving a generous gift from a higher SES giver 
were mediated by attributing the act to pity, and whether such attributions were predicted by an 
awareness of one’s relatively lower status (in Studies 3 and 4).  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 218 university students (37 males and 181 females; Mage= 19.88, SD = 
2.24) recruited from the psychology department participant pool. We excluded three additional 
students due to experimenter error (the condition was not recorded) and six who were suspicious 
about the confederate posing as the giver (nhigh-SES,$5 = 4, nhigh-SES,$8 = 1, nlow-SES,$8 = 1). Analyses 
combined across two samples that were run with a very similar paradigm and yielded parallel 
effects.2 In both samples, students received course credit and $8 for completing the study. This 
study was run in 2011/2012 and, based on conventions at that time, we aimed to collect 25 
participants for each condition (there were 4 conditions, and two samples, therefore a target of 
200; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). A sensitivity analysis (1 - β = .80, α = .05) using 
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G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) suggests that our sample of 218 can detect 
effects of f >= .19 (partial η2 ~= .20). 
Procedure 
Participants were run individually along with a confederate. The experimenter described 
the study as an investigation of how economic decisions are affected by knowledge about one’s 
partner. To that end, both parties filled out and exchanged a “biographical sheet” that included 
several questions about personality traits and common activities and interests. The actual purpose 
of this exchange of information, however, was to make the participant’s relative SES salient. 
Based in part on their own self-reported SES, participants were assigned to either the low-SES 
condition, in which their partner appeared to be relatively higher in status, or the high-SES 
condition, in which their partner appeared to have about the same status as them. Specifically, 
the last question on the biographical sheet asked participants to rate their socioeconomic status 
relative to other undergraduate students at the same institution on a ladder, where 1 was the 
lowest rung and 10 was the highest rung (see Kilpatrick & Cantril, 1960). To achieve roughly 
equal groups in each condition, participants were assigned to the low-SES condition if their own 
response was 6 or lower (n = 103), and were assigned to the high-SES condition if their response 
was 7 or higher (n = 115).  
Although participants were assigned to condition based on their self-reported SES 
relative to other undergraduate students, we also boosted the participants’ perceptions of their 
SES relative to the confederate by emphasizing the confederate’s ostensibly high SES. In Sample 
1a, the confederate always circled 9 on the ladder measure, whereas in Sample 1b, the 
confederate’s SES was yoked to be three points higher than that of participants in the low-SES 
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condition and the same as that of participants in the high-SES condition. To make it extremely 
obvious to the participants that their partner was relatively high in SES, the confederate’s sheet 
indicated that his/her parents both had post-graduate degrees and professional jobs, and that he or 
she enjoyed various costly activities, but had no need for a job while attending school (adapted 
from Croizet & Claire, 1998; Régner et al., 2002).  
After completing the biographical sheet, the participant was ostensibly randomly 
assigned to act as the receiver during the economic game (thereby making the confederate the 
giver by default). The completed biographical sheets were exchanged (enabling the participant to 
assess their SES relative to the confederate’s), and the confederate was taken to another room to 
“make her/his monetary decision”. The participant was told that the study was actually about 
how much money the giver (i.e., the confederate) decided to give and how it made them feel, but 
that the receiver would be asked to fill out the same emotion questionnaire for comparison 
purposes. In actuality, the confederate randomly selected an envelope containing either $5 (an 
equitable split of the $10) or $8 (an overly generous amount) and delivered it in person to the 
participant with a neutral facial expression. After the confederate left the room, the participant 
completed the final emotion questionnaire (including a manipulation check question), was 
carefully debriefed, and was always paid $8.  
Measures 
Manipulation check of perceived relative SES. As a manipulation check at the end of 
the study, participants rated their perceived SES relative to their partner’s on a single item (1 = 
much lower, 5 = much higher). 
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Attributions for the giver’s behavior. Participants made ratings of the giver, and 
reported their attributions for the amount he/she gave. Of greatest interest were attributions to: 
pity (“She feels sorry for me”, “She thinks I need the money”; r(214) = .75, p < .001; M =2.79, 
SD = 1.64), and fairness (“She was trying to be fair”; M =5.72, SD = 1.55), rated on a 7-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants also rated the giver’s generosity on 
a single item (“indicate how well each of the traits describes your partner: generous”; 1 = not at 
all descriptive, 7 = extremely descriptive; M = 5.71, SD = 1.22), as part of a set of questions 
about perceptions of the partner.3  
Affective responses. Participants used a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) to 
rate the extent to which they felt each of 25 emotions after receiving money in the dictator game 
(adapted from Diener et al., 2010; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants’ responses 
were grouped into conceptual composites of self-conscious negative affect (embarrassed, guilty, 
disgraced, sorry, ashamed, regret, humiliated, remorseful; α = .86; M =1.68, SD = .85) and 
positive affect (proud, content, good, satisfied, happy, excited, connected, calm; α = .88; M = 
4.29, SD = 1.21).  
See Supplementary Materials for a full list of all measures used in all studies (or see the 
materials, posted online here: https://osf.io/yh7wu/) and more detail on procedural differences in 
the two samples in this study. 
Results 
Manipulation Check – Perceived Relative SES  
An independent samples t-test confirmed that the manipulation was successful; 
participants in the low-SES condition reported feeling significantly lower in SES compared to 
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the confederate (M = 1.80, SD = 1.01) than did participants in the high-SES condition (M = 2.61, 
SD = .66), t(214) = 7.07, p < .001, d = .95. Moreover, a one sample t-test against the scale 
midpoint (3 = about the same) confirmed that participants in the low-SES condition believed 
their SES to be significantly lower than the confederate’s, t(101) = -12.02, p < .001, d = 1.20 (see 
Rosnow & Rosenthal, 2003 for effect size formula). However, it is important to point out that 
participants in the high-SES condition (i.e., who perceived their SES to be high relative to other 
students), also reported feeling significantly lower in SES than their partner, t(113) = -6.26, p < 
.001, d = .594.  
Attributions for the Giver’s Behavior 
A 2 (SES: low-SES vs. high-SES) x 2 (money: $5 vs. $8) ANOVA on receivers’ 
attributions yielded two significant main effects that were qualified by a significant interaction 
predicting attributions of pity (means and a summary of results for all variables are provided in 
Table 1). Simple main effect analyses revealed that, as hypothesized, when people received the 
more generous $8 gift, participants in the low-SES condition attributed the giver’s behavior more 
to pity than did participants in the high-SES condition, F(1, 212) = 35.22, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.14. When participants received the even split of $5, participants in the low-SES condition also 
attributed the giver’s behavior more to pity than did participants in the high-SES condition, F(1, 
212) = 4.10, p = .04, partial η2 = .02, but the difference was considerably smaller.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
In contrast to this hypothesized interaction effect on attributions to pity, attributions to 
generosity and fairness were predicted by the amount of money given, but not by SES condition 
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or the interaction. Unsurprisingly, people who received $8 deemed the giver as more generous 
and the gift as less fair than did people who received $5 (see Table 1). 
Affective Responses 
Two 2 (SES condition) x 2 (money) ANOVAs on self-conscious and positive affect 
revealed only two significant main effects (see Table 1). People who received $8 felt 
significantly more self-conscious negative affect (NA) and significantly less positive affect (PA) 
than did participants who received $5. More relevant to our predictions, participants in the low-
SES condition felt significantly more self-conscious NA and significantly less PA after receiving 
money than participants in the high-SES condition. Although the hypothesized SES by money 
interaction was not significant on either affective variable, these additive main effects highlight 
that participants in the low-SES condition who received the generous $8 amount had the most 
negative affective consequences among the four conditions.  
Indirect Effects of Relative SES on Affective Responses  
Finally, we tested the hypothesis that receiving $8 rather than $5 elicits negative affective 
reactions because the gift seems motivated by pity (and not by fairness or generosity) 5. We 
expected this indirect effect of generosity on affective reactions via pity to be significantly larger 
among participants in the low-SES condition. To test these hypotheses, we conducted moderated 
mediational analyses using bias-corrected bootstrap analyses (with 10,000 resamples) in model 7 
of PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). Two analyses were conducted to estimate effects on self-conscious 
affect and positive affect (both z-scored) separately. In each analysis, pity, fairness, and 
generosity (all z-scored) were included as simultaneous mediators. 
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Self-conscious affect. Consistent with our hypotheses, these analyses revealed that SES 
condition only moderated the indirect effect of money on self-conscious affect via pity, b = -.04 
(SE = .02), CI95 = [-.10, -.01], but not via generosity, b = .001 (SE = .01), CI95 = [-.01, .01] or 
fairness, b = .003 (SE = .01), CI95 = [-.01, .04] (see Figure 1). As predicted, the indirect effect of 
money on self-conscious affect via pity was stronger for people in the low-SES condition, b = 
.10 (SE = .04), CI95 = [.03, .18], than for people in the high-SES condition, b = .06 (SE = .02), 
CI95 = [.02, .11]. Among those in the low-SES condition, receiving the more generous amount 
($8 vs. $5) led to higher ratings of pity, b = .45 (SE = .06), CI95 = [.33, .56], which predicted 
greater self-conscious negative affect. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Positive affect. Similarly, SES condition significantly moderated the indirect effect of 
money on positive affect via attributions to pity, b = .04 (SE = .02), CI95 = [.01, .10], but not via 
generosity, b = -.01 (SE = .04), CI95 = [-.10, .07] or fairness, b = -.01 (SE = .01), CI95 = [-.04, 
.02] (see Figure 2). The indirect effect via pity was stronger for people in the low-SES condition, 
b = -.10 (SE = .04), CI95 = [-.18, -.04], than for people in the high-SES condition, b = -.06 (SE = 
.02), CI95 = [-.11, -.02]. 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Discussion 
 Although receiving a generous gift of money might rationally be considered a positive 
outcome, the results of this study provide evidence that receiving money from a partner who is 
perceived to be higher in SES can carry an emotional cost. The affective experience of receiving 
$8 (instead of $5 – an even 50/50 split of the money) varied depending on one’s SES relative to 
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the giver. If one’s SES was perceived to be lower than that of the giver, this unexpected act of 
generosity was attributed to pity, which predicted more self-conscious negative affect and less 
positive affect as a result. Together, these results suggest that those who perceive themselves to 
be lower in SES relative to a giver are less able to reap the emotional benefits of a generous gift, 
to the extent that they feel pitied by a giver perceived to be higher status. Although there was a 
general tendency across the sample to feel worse after receiving a generous monetary gift, those 
who were induced to feel relatively lower in status compared to their partner felt the least 
positive (and the most negative) after receiving a generous gift.  
These findings are consistent with past evidence of self-esteem decrements when people 
feel they are the recipient of aid during a token economy game (Fisher & Nadler, 1976). Using a 
much larger sample than that earlier study, we find that emotional costs occur even when real 
money is exchanged in the context of perceptible socioeconomic status differences. We also 
extend the earlier results by showing that the affective responses can be explained by recipients’ 
attributions; heightened self-conscious emotions are mediated by recipients’ feelings that the 
giver pitied them. In fact, whereas the self-esteem threat explanation proposed by Fisher et al. 
(1982) predicts that targets of aid would suffer lower self-esteem and would perceive the giver 
negatively, we did not find clear evidence that lower SES targets who received a generous gift 
reported a reduction in self-esteem or perceived the giver negatively (see SOM for details). 
One limitation to the current study is that although we were able to manipulate relative 
differences in status between the two conditions, we were not successful in creating a condition 
where participants felt they were equal in status to the giver. Rather, across the conditions, 
participants (even those who at baseline rated their SES as high) felt somewhat lower in SES 
than the confederate (albeit to varying degrees). This may be because the concrete, objective SES 
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information provided about the confederate (i.e., their parents’ education and occupations) 
tended to make all participants feel lower in relative SES. As a result, we observed two main 
effects rather than the predicted interaction on affective response. Nonetheless, the moderated 
mediation analysis provides evidence that the observed effects are driven more by those in the 
low SES condition. In Study 4, we were more successful in manipulating a sense of equal status 
by using a status salience manipulation. 
A second limitation of the methods in Study 1 is the somewhat contrived nature of the 
dictator game paradigm. Although this economic paradigm allowed us to control the context to 
better isolate the affective costs of being the target of generosity, one might question the 
generalizability of these effects to naturalistic contexts of receiving monetary gifts. For example, 
in real life situations of interpersonal giving, the gift received might result from a specific request 
or otherwise meet a clear need in the person’s life. Perhaps the effects identified in Study 1 only 
occur in a narrow range of experiences where generous gifts are a surprise and seem symbolic of 
status differences. Alternatively, giving across the status divide might more generally signal 
status differences in ways that easily trigger these affective costs. A goal of Study 2 was to study 
this phenomenon with real life experiences and test several possible moderators of effects. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we solicited people’s idiosyncratic experiences of receiving generous gifts of 
money, extending past experimental research by examining these effects more naturalistically in 
terms of people’s lived experiences. After recounting such an experience, participants rated their 
affective reactions to the gift and their perceived SES relative to the giver. Because all 
participants were asked to recall a gift they considered to be generous (i.e., there was no “fair” 
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condition as in Study 1), we predicted a main effect of relative SES on pity attributions and 
affective reactions. We measured and tested several potentially relevant moderating variables 
(e.g., need, closeness to the giver, in-person vs. anonymous giving, requested vs. unrequested 
gift). This correlational event-sampling method allowed us to gain a better sense of whether this 
phenomenon is something most people have experienced in their lives, or is something quite 
specific to the constrained set of circumstances created by the dictator game paradigm.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 A total of 565 American adults were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were 
paid $0.20. In the end, 477 participants provided complete data. Respondents were asked to think 
about a time when they had personally received a generous gift or charitable donation with no 
expectation that they would reciprocate (e.g., “A friend offers to pay for a movie ticket for 
another friend who worries that they couldn’t really afford the expense”; see SOM for complete 
instructions). In the prompt, we did not direct participants to consider the status of the giver. 
Instead, after rating several aspects of the experience, including their attributions and affective 
reactions, we measured participants’ perceived SES relative to the giver’s. This study was run in 
2014, thus our sample size was based on conventions at that time (Simmons et al., 2011); given 
that we wanted to test moderation by several possible variables, we aimed to collect a large 
sample of 500 participants. 
Of the 477 participants who provided complete data, the majority of respondents (N = 
363; 76%) were able to recall an episode of receiving that met our criteria6, suggesting that such 
experiences are not uncommon. Among these events, the vast majority of participants described 
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experiences of receiving a generous gift from someone of equal or higher status (N = 331; 91%). 
Because our aim was to replicate the effects of Study 1 in a more naturalistic set of experiences, 
these 331 participants constituted our final sample. A sensitivity analysis (1 - β = .80, α = .05) 
suggests that our sample of 331 can detect effects where f2 >= .03. 
Participants (55% female) were predominantly White (79%) adults (Mage = 34.10, SD = 
12.18) with at least some post-secondary education (92%). They considered themselves 
somewhat below average with respect to socioeconomic advantages (M = 4.73, SD = 1.76; on a 
10-point scale; range = 1 – 9) and reported an average household income of $49,213 (on a single, 
open-ended question: “What is your yearly household income (before taxes)?”; SD = $52,960; 
range = $0 - $750,000). As shown in the SOM, this sample is fairly representative of (although 
more educated than) United States averages. 
Measures 
Perceived relative SES. Participants were asked to indicate their perceived financial 
situation relative to “the situation of the person (people) who made this gift/donation” (using a 7-
point scale: 1 = Much lower, 4 = Equal, 7 = Much higher; final sample M = 2.17, SD = 1.09, 
range = 1 – 4 after retaining only examples of cross-status receiving).  
Core measures of attribution and affect. The same core measures used in Study 1 were 
again included in this study. These included attributions to pity (on the same two items as in 
Study 1), fairness (on the same single-item as in Study 1), and generosity (on a single-item 
measure, “He/she is a generous person”). Measures of both self-conscious negative affect and 
positive affect were also the same as those used in Study 1. See Table 2 for means, standard 
deviations, and measures of reliability. 
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<insert Table 2 here> 
We added an attribution: “He/she expected that I would pay them back or reciprocate,” to 
act as a compliance check, because participants were asked to think about a gift with no 
expectations of reciprocation. The low mean on this scale suggested that participants were able 
to recall gifts that required little to no reciprocation (M = 1.45, SD = 1.12, on a 7-point scale). 
Moderators. In order to test possible moderating factors, we asked participants to rate 
whether the gift was made directly in person (n = 226) or indirectly from either a person or group 
(n = 105), the relationship between them and the giver (dichotomized during analysis as either 
friend/family, n = 205, or acquaintance/stranger/group/organization, n = 126), whether the gift 
was requested (n = 32) or not (n = 298), whether the gift was expected (n = 135) or not (n = 196), 
and for the subsample who expected the gift, the extent to which the gift exceeded expectations 
(rated on a scale from 1 = much less than what was expected to 7 = much more than was 
expected; M = 5.82, SD = 1.37). Participants also rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = 
extremely) their similarity to the giver (M = 4.76, SD = 1.59), and the extent to which the gift 
filled a need (“To what degree did you feel like you really needed this gift/donation”, “To what 
degree did the gift/donation allow you to meet some important need”; r(331) = .71, p < .001; M 
= 4.81, SD = 1.93). We coded the type of gift as non-monetary (e.g., concert tickets, paying for 
dinner; n = 172), money not intended for anything specific (n = 58), money intended for 
something specific (e.g., groceries; n = 78), both monetary and non-monetary (n = 19), or 
unclear (n = 4). Because open-ended ratings of the monetary value of received gifts were 
positively skewed (range = $1.25 – $150,000, Mdn = $100), they were log transformed (M = 
2.22, SD = 0.96; range = 0.10 – 5.18). 
Results 
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Descriptive Statistics 
  Because one concern from Study 1 was that the dictator game might constitute a rather 
rare experience of giving, we first compared the features of the recalled gift-receiving occasions 
to the context created by the laboratory paradigm in Study 1. In the lab situation, the gift was 
unrequested and received in person from a relatively similar stranger (a fellow student). In the 
current study, participants often recalled receiving unrequested gifts (90%) in person (68%) from 
similar others (M = 4.76, SD = 1.59 on a 7-point scale). Although the remembered gifts were 
usually from close others (62%), there were a substantial proportion from more distant others 
(38%). This descriptive evidence reveals variability in people’s experiences, but also suggests 
that the artificial lab scenario shared many features in common with real-world examples of 
receiving gifts/donations. For bivariate correlations between measures of interest, see Table 2. 
Analytic Strategy 
Recall that because we focused only on sampling what participants self-identified as acts 
of generosity, our primary goal was to test the main effect relationship between the naturalistic 
range of measured status differences and reactions to acts of generosity. However, all analyses 
controlled for variability in the monetary value of the gift, which predicted positive affect (see 
SOM for results without monetary value as a covariate). Except in one case (footnoted below), 
monetary value did not moderate effects. Thus, key outcomes were regressed onto the gift’s 
monetary value (log-transformed, z-scored) in step 1 as a covariate, and relative SES (z-scored) 
in step 2, in a hierarchical regression analysis. 
Attributions for the Giver’s Behavior 
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As hypothesized, and replicating the $8 (i.e., generous) condition of Study 1, results of 
the regression analysis revealed that the lower participants were in perceived SES compared to 
the giver, the more they attributed the generous gift to the giver’s feelings of pity, b = -.28 (SE = 
.11), t(315) = -2.54, p = .01, CI95 = [-.50, -.06]. Monetary value was not a significant covariate, b 
= .10 (SE = .11), t(316) = 0.95, p = .34, CI95 = [-.11, .32]. Attributions to generosity and fairness 
were not predicted by relative SES, and thus could not mediate effects on recipients’ affective 
responses (see SOM for detailed statistics). 
Affective Responses 
Using the same approach, regression analyses revealed that, as hypothesized, the lower 
participants were in perceived SES compared to the giver, the more self-conscious NA they 
reported feeling, b = -.16 (SE = .07), t(315) = -2.13, p = .03, CI95 = [-.30, -.01]. A parallel 
analysis on positive affect found no significant effect of relative SES, b = .10 (SE = .07), t(315) = 
1.31, p = .19, CI95 = [-.05, .24]. When receiving gifts of higher perceived value, people generally 
experienced more positive affect, b = .15 (SE = .07), t(316) = 2.03, p = .04, CI95 = [.004, .29], but 
not more or less self-conscious negative affect, b = -.06 (SE = .07), t(316) = -0.87, p = .39, CI95 = 
[-.20, .08]7.  
Indirect Effects of Relative SES on Affective Responses  
Across both negative self-conscious affect and attributions to pity, we observed a 
significant main effect of relative SES. Our next step was to use model 4 of PROCESS to test for 
indirect effects of relative SES (z-scored; X) on negative self-conscious affect (z-scored; Y), via 
attributions to pity (z-scored; M), with monetary value (log-transformed, z-scored) included as a 
covariate. We also conducted a parallel analysis on positive affect given that it is possible for 
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indirect effects to be significant and meaningful even in the absence of a significant direct effect 
(Kenny & Judd, 2014).  
Self-conscious affect. Consistent with Study 1, there was an indirect effect of relative 
SES on negative self-conscious affect via attributions to pity, b = -.06 (SE = .03), CI95 = [-.12, -
.01]. Those with lower SES relative to the giver reported greater attributions to pity, b = -.15 (SE 
= .06), t(315) = -2.54, p = .01, CI95 = [-.26, -.03], which was in turn, related to negative self-
conscious affect, controlling for relative SES and money, b = .38 (SE = .05), t(313) = 7.31, p < 
.001, CI95 = [.28, .49].  
 Positive affect. Although the direct effect of relative SES on positive affect was not 
significant, the indirect effect of relative SES on positive affect via pity was significant, b = .03 
(SE = .02), CI95 = [.01, .07]. Higher attributions to pity made by those with lower relative SES 
were related to experiencing less positive affect, controlling for relative SES and monetary value, 
b = -.22 (SE = .06), t(314) = -3.98, p < .001, CI95 = [-.33, -.11]. 
Moderation by Gift-giving and Recipient Characteristics 
 Thus far, analyses have collapsed across the features of the giving situation, providing a 
conceptual replication of Study 1 over a broader range of experiences. To test whether any of the 
measured variables moderated effects, we next used model 1 of PROCESS to test each potential 
moderator on self-conscious NA, and PA. In each analysis, we used relative SES (z-scored; X), 
and the moderator variable (dummy-coded or z-scored; M) to predict affect (z-scored; Y), 
controlling for money given (log-transformed, z-scored). See SOM for a table of detailed results. 
These analyses showed no evidence that the relationships between relative SES and either 
affect measure were moderated by any of the variables tested: gender of the recipient, gift type 
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(non-specific monetary vs. non-monetary), whether the gift was received in person, the 
receiver’s relationship with the giver, whether the gift was in response to a request, expected, 
from a similar giver, or was perceived as filling a need. The lack of significant moderation in this 
fairly large sample provides some indication that the negative affective costs associated with 
receiving gifts from a higher status giver are not constrained to a narrow range of experiences. 
Interestingly, the negative affective sting of a generous gift from a higher status giver is felt even 
when one has requested the gift and it fills an important need; in fact, both of these variables 
were associated with feeling more self-conscious NA in general, regardless of one’s relative 
SES.  
Discussion 
 In both the lab experiment of Study 1 and with actual recalled experiences of receiving in 
Study 2, generous gifts were associated with greater self-conscious negative affect to the extent 
that the recipient perceived themselves to be lower in SES than the giver. Tests of indirect effects 
in Study 2 revealed a pattern consistent with our theory that perceiving oneself as having lower 
SES than a giver is associated with a more negative affective reaction to a generous gift, to the 
extent that this gift seems motivated by pity. Furthermore, by replicating the general phenomena 
using people’s recalled experiences, we have greater confidence that the effects in Study 1 were 
not specific to the somewhat contrived nature of a dictator game. Importantly, the event-
sampling method used in Study 2 suggests that such experiences of being the recipient of 
generosity from higher status others are not unusual (of those who provided complete data and a 
valid example of receiving, 91% recalled events of cross-status giving), and the negative 
affective costs were not exclusive to certain types of events (e.g., unexpected or unneeded gifts, 
or giving that occurred in person, both of which were the case in the dictator game of Study 1).  
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Study 3 
In Study 3, we sought to replicate the Study 2 findings with some modifications to the 
survey. First, we were concerned that using the term ‘charitable donation’ in our instruction 
prompt might have inadvertently primed negative connotations and/or called to mind very 
specific types of experiences confounded with having lower SES. In addition, in Study 2, many 
participants recalled receiving gifts from family members, which might trigger different 
psychological reactions than gifts from less close others, due to expectations of kin reciprocity 
(Stewart-Williams, 2007). Thus, in Study 3, we used a modified recall prompt asking 
participants to recall a gift (but NOT a charitable donation) from someone other than a close 
family member.  
The second key goal of Study 3 was to provide a clearer test of our hypothesis that the 
effects observed are a result of making status differences salient, in line with a social identity 
threat interpretation. Alternatively, a self-esteem threat perspective would predict that individuals 
with relatively lower status would be more prone to evaluate themselves negatively relative to 
higher status others (e.g., see themselves as less competent or feel a lower sense of belonging), 
and feel bad and pitied as a result of that disempowering upward social comparison. To test these 
explanations, we included measures of status awareness, perceived competence, and perceived 
social belonging. We tested the hypothesis that receiving a generous gift from a higher status 
giver makes status differences salient, which then predicts the receiver attributing the gift to the 
giver’s pity, and feeling worse about receiving a generous gift.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
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 To estimate the needed sample size, we conducted an a priori power analysis using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). This analysis (with 1- β = .95, α = .05) 
suggested a minimum sample of 444 participants to detect a small effect of f2 = .05 (we powered 
this study for small effects given the exploratory tests of the higher order interactions which tend 
to be smaller in magnitude than other effects). Because 80% of participants in Study 2 were able 
to remember a receiving event, we aimed to recruit at least 600 participants, anticipating that 
about 500 of those would be able to remember an event meeting our criteria. 
 Out of 1007 American adults who were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
paid $0.20, 641 participants provided complete, non-duplicate data8. Respondents received the 
same instructions as in Study 2, except that they were asked to think about a time when they had 
personally received a generous gift (charitable donations were not mentioned), from someone 
who was NOT a member of the participant’s immediate family (see SOM for complete 
instructions).  
Of the 641 participants who provided complete, non-duplicate data, the majority of 
respondents (N = 488; 76%) were able to recall an experience of receiving a gift of the type we 
described, suggesting that such experiences are not uncommon. Among these events, the vast 
majority of participants described experiences of receiving a gift from someone of equal or 
higher status (N = 426; 87%). These 426 participants constituted our final sample, which was 
only slightly smaller than our target sample size of 444. A sensitivity analysis (1 - β = .80, α = 
.05) suggests that our sample of 426 can detect effects in multiple regression analysis where f2 
>= .03. The demographics of the participants were very similar to those of Study 2 (see SOM for 
details on sample comparisons to national averages).  
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Measures 
Perceived relative SES. Participants were asked to indicate their financial situation 
relative to “the situation of the person (people) who gave you this gift” using the same scale as in 
Study 2 (final sample M = 2.63, SD = 1.18, range = 1 – 4 after retaining only examples of cross-
status receiving).  
Core measures of attribution and affect. The same core measures used in Studies 1 and 
2 were again included in this study. These included attributions to pity (on the same two items as 
in Studies 1 and 2), generosity (the same single-item as in Study 2), and fairness (the same 
single-item as in Studies 1 and 2). We also included the same self-conscious negative emotions, 
and positive emotions as in Studies 1 and 2. See Table 3 for means, standard deviations, and 
measures of reliability. 
<insert Table 3 here> 
Status awareness, perceived competence, and belonging. Status awareness was 
assessed by asking participants to rate how the money they received made them feel about 
themselves relative to the person who gave them the gift, on three 7-point semantic differentials 
(“aware of my social class: unaware of my social class,” “lower in status: higher in status,” 
“submissive: dominant”). In addition to these status-specific items, as part of the same prompt 
we also assessed participants’ perceived competence relative to the giver with four items 
(“incapable: capable,” “unintelligent: intelligent,” “doubtful: confident,” “incompetent: 
competent”), and their feelings of perceived belonging with four items (“devalued:valued,” “like 
an outsider:like I belong,” “rejected: accepted,” “disrespected: respected”). Status awareness was 
only moderately correlated with perceived competence and belonging, which were highly 
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correlated with one another (see Table 3).9  Nonetheless, we analyzed all three as conceptually 
distinct possible mediators. Results are similar if we instead combine competence and belonging 
as an overall measure of self-evaluation relative to the giver. 
Moderators. In order to test possible moderating factors, we asked participants to 
indicate the relationship between them and the giver (dichotomized as in Study 2: friend/family, 
n = 200, or acquaintance/stranger/group/organization, n = 226). Consistent with the change in the 
instructions eliciting the memory of receiving money, which said the giver should not be a 
member of the participant’s immediate family, participants remembered fewer instances of 
receiving from a family member in Study 3 (3%) vs. Study 2 (32%). We added a new question to 
go beyond the coarse measure of relationship type; participants rated how close they were to the 
giver (M = 4.09, SD = 2.06). As in Study 2, participants also indicated their similarity to the 
giver (M = 4.54, SD = 1.62), whether the gift was requested (n = 23) or not (n = 402), and the 
extent to which the gift filled a need (on the same two items as in Study 2; r(426) = .77, p < .001; 
M = 4.57, SD = 2.00), all on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). We again coded the 
gift type: non-monetary (n = 280), money not intended for anything specific (n = 57), money 
intended for something specific (e.g., groceries; n = 60), both monetary and non-monetary (n = 
13), or unclear (n = 14). Open-ended ratings of the monetary value of received gifts were again 
positively skewed (range = $0.02 – $100,000, Mdn = $100) and thus log transformed (M = 1.98, 
SD = 0.83; range = -1.70 – 5.00). 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
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 As in Study 2, the real-world examples of receiving gifts shared many features in 
common with the artificial lab scenario in Study 1: participants often recalled receiving 
unrequested gifts (94%) from similar others (M = 4.54, SD = 1.62). Given that this study 
excluded gifts from members of the immediate family, the recalled scenarios were even more 
similar to the lab scenario than those in Study 2. For bivariate correlations between measures of 
interest, see Table 3.  
Attributions for the Giver’s Behavior 
We used the same analytic approach employed in Study 2 to regress relative SES on key 
outcome variables, controlling for variation in the monetary value of the gift. In this study, we 
again found that the lower participants were in perceived SES compared to the giver, the more 
they attributed the gift (controlling for its value) to the giver’s feelings of pity, b = -.43 (SE = 
.10), t(422) = -4.38, p < .001, CI95 = [-.62, -.24]. Monetary value was a significant covariate on 
the first step of the analysis: gifts of higher perceived value were also more likely to be attributed 
to pity, b = .32 (SE = .10), t(424) = 3.26, p = .001, CI95 = [.13, .52]. Attributions to generosity 
and fairness were unrelated to relative SES (consistent with Study 2; see SOM for detailed 
statistics). See SOM for results without monetary value as a covariate. 
Affective Responses 
In contrast to the earlier studies that revealed significant direct effects of relative SES on 
self-conscious NA, the direct effect of relative SES on self-conscious negative affect was not 
significant in Study 3, b = -.08 (SE = .06), t(422) = -1.36, p = .18, CI95 = [-.21, .04]. However, 
relative SES did have a significant direct effect on positive affect that was in line with 
hypotheses: People lower in relative SES recalled less PA after receiving a generous gift, b = .19 
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(SE = .06), t(422) = 3.16, p = .002, CI95 = [.07, .31]. As in Study 2, people who received gifts 
with a higher monetary value recalled experiencing more PA, b = .15 (SE = .06), t(423) = 2.44, p 
= .02, CI95 = [.03, .26], but not less or more self-conscious NA, b = .02 (SE = .06), t(423) = 0.35, 
p = .73, CI95 = [-.10, .14].  
Indirect Effects of Relative SES on Attributions and Affective Responses 
Attributions of pity. A unique goal of Study 3 was to test whether those with lower 
relative SES made greater attributions to pity due to an increased awareness of status differences 
(consistent with a social identity threat approach), and/or due to people evaluating themselves 
negatively in terms of either perceived competence or belonging (consistent with an upward 
comparison or self-esteem threat approach). Initial analyses revealed that people who were lower 
in relative SES reported higher status awareness, b = -.23 (SE = .05), t(422) = -5.16, p < .001, 
CI95 = [-.32, -.14], lower perceived competence, b = .26 (SE = .06), t(422) = 4.47, p < .001, CI95 
= [.14, .37], and a lower sense of belonging, b = .15 (SE = .06), t(422) = 2.65, p = .01, CI95 = 
[.04, .26]. Monetary value was not a significant covariate in any of these analyses: b = .01 (SE = 
.05), t(423) = 0.11, p = .92, CI95 = [-.09, .10]; b = .10 (SE = .06), t(423) = 1.79, p = .08, CI95 = [-
.01, .22]; b = .02 (SE = .06), t(423) = 0.26, p = .79, CI95 = [-.10, .13]. Given these effects, status 
awareness, perceived competence, or belonging could each potentially mediate the indirect effect 
of relative SES on attributions to pity and affective responses.  
However, when we used model 4 in PROCESS to examine which of these three variables 
uniquely mediates the relationship between relative SES and attribution to pity in a simultaneous 
mediation model controlling for monetary value, only status awareness showed a significant 
indirect effect, b = -.03 (SE = .02), CI95 = [-.07, -.01]. Neither the indirect effect for perceived 
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competence b = -.03 (SE = .02), CI95 = [-.07, .001], nor belonging, b = .01 (SE = .01), CI95 = [-
.004, .04] was significant. Thus, only status awareness was retained as a mediator of the 
relationship between relative SES and pity in the following serial mediation. 
Serial mediation. Our next step was to test a serial path model, where having relatively 
lower SES predicts greater status awareness, and in turn attributions to pity, and finally affective 
outcomes. To present analyses consistent with Study 2, we modeled the relationships to both 
self-conscious and positive affect (in two separate models). We tested these indirect effects in 
model 6 of PROCESS, predicting affect (z-scored; Y) from relative SES (z-scored; X), status 
awareness, and pity (both z-scored; M). We controlled for monetary value (log-transformed, z-
scored) and measures of perceived competence and belonging (both z-scored). In line with our 
hypotheses, the test of the full serial mediational model for self-conscious negative affect was 
significant, b = -.01 (SE = .003), CI95 = [-.02, -.002] (see Figure 3). In addition, the indirect effect 
of relative SES on self-conscious affect via only pity was significant, b = -.04 (SE = .02), CI95 = 
[-.08, -.02] (replicating Study 2), as was the indirect effect via only status awareness, b = -.03 
(SE = .01), CI95 = [-.06, -.01]. 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
The test of the full serial mediational model for positive affect was also significant, b = 
.003 (SE = .002), CI95 = [.001, .01] (see Figure 4). Replicating Study 2, the indirect effect via 
only pity was significant, b = .02 (SE = .01), CI95 = [.01, .05], although the indirect via only 
status awareness was not significant, b = -.01 (SE = .01), CI95 = [-.03, .01]. 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
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 Together, these results suggest that the indirect effects are unique to status awareness. 
There was no clear evidence that effects are better explained by lower SES participants feeling 
relatively less competent compared to a higher SES giver, or less belonging.  
Moderation by Gift-Giving and Recipient Characteristics 
 Finally, as in Study 2, we used model 1 of PROCESS to test each potential moderator of 
the relationship between relative SES and affective responses (z-scored; Y). In a series of 
moderated regression analysis, we entered relative SES (z-scored; X), the moderator variable 
(dummy-coded or z-scored; M), and monetary value (log-transformed, z-scored) as a covariate. 
A table of detailed results are summarized in the SOM. 
As in Study 2, these analyses showed little evidence that the relationships between 
relative SES and negative self-conscious affect were moderated by any of the following variables 
tested: recipient gender, gift type (non-specific monetary vs. non-monetary), what the 
relationship was with the gift giver (both the relationship type and the closeness, and similarity), 
whether the gift was in response to a request, or was perceived as filling a need. As in Study 2, 
need was associated with feeling more self-conscious NA, regardless of one’s relative SES and 
controlling for the monetary value of the gift. It is interesting that across both Studies 2 and 3, 
there is no evidence that one’s affective reactions to generosity are muted by having a need 
fulfilled. 
For positive affect, the only significant moderation was an interaction between relative 
SES and similarity, b = .12 (SE = .05), CI95 = [.02, .21]. The conditional effects suggested that 
being lower in relative SES was associated with less positive affect especially when receiving a 
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gift from a similar, b = .23 (SE = .07), CI95 = [.10, .37], rather than a less similar other, b = -.002 
(SE = .07), CI95 = [-.14, .13].10  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 3 provide additional evidence that when recalling past experiences 
of being the target of generosity, those with lower relative status are more likely to attribute the 
gift to pity, and subsequently feel less positive affect (as a direct effect) and more self-conscious 
negative affect (as an indirect effect). Although the observed effects on negative and positive 
affective outcomes have varied somewhat from study to study (but see meta-analysis later), the 
overall results align with the general model that when receiving a generous gift from a higher 
status giver, recipients see these gifts as motivated not only by generosity or fairness, but also as 
a signal of their lower status and being pitied.  
Tests of serial mediation yielded evidence consistent with a social identity threat 
perspective, but revealed no clear evidence consistent with a self-esteem threat (or upward 
comparison) perspective. Although those with relatively lower SES reported feeling lower 
belonging and less competent relative to a higher SES giver, neither of these variables uniquely 
predicted participants’ tendency to attribute the gift to pity after controlling for status awareness. 
In contrast, those with lower SES reported feeling aware of those status differences after 
receiving a generous gift, which predicted attributions to pity and affective responses. Thus, one 
key theoretical nuance of these findings is to show that the emotional sting of being the recipient 
of a generous gift is better explained by status salience than by social rejection or a strong sense 
of disempowerment.  
SES AND HELPING  37 
Interestingly, across two large samples where people were reflecting on their own real-
world experiences, we observed no evidence that these relationships were moderated by the 
degree to which the gift was requested or fulfilled an important need; generous gifts to lower 
status others were associated with status differences regardless of the practical utility of those 
gifts. There was also some evidence in this study (but not in Study 2), that effects might be 
stronger when people feel similar to the giver. This might seem to conceptually replicate earlier 
experimental findings based on much smaller samples suggesting that receiving aid from a 
similar (vs. dissimilar) other is most damaging to self-esteem (Fisher et al., 1978; Fisher & 
Nadler, 1974; Nadler et al., 1976). Given that this effect did not replicate in Study 2, we hesitate 
to draw a strong conclusion. Keep in mind, however, that disallowing gifts from close family in 
Study 3 may have enabled this relationship to become more apparent. Also, with respect to the 
wording changes between Studies 2 and 3, the direct effects on self-conscious negative affect 
were perhaps weaker in Study 3 because we eliminated mention of ‘charitable donations.’ We 
believe, however, that the consistency in the indirect effects on both negative and positive 
affective measures suggests that we are capturing a broader phenomenon across these studies.  
Having found some evidence in this correlational paradigm that status awareness is one 
key mechanism by which these effects occur, we designed a final study to experimentally 
manipulate status awareness in order to isolate its causal effects on downstream attributional and 
affective outcomes.  
Study 4 
In Study 4, we returned to the dictator paradigm used in Study 1. Because our focus was 
on reactions to generosity, all participants in this study received $8 (out of $10) from a 
confederate. The key manipulation was whether or not participants were made aware of relative 
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status differences before receiving a generous gift from a stranger (i.e., the confederate). We 
assessed the same measures of attributions and affective reactions used in Study 1. We also 
added the measures of status awareness, perceived competence, and belonging from Study 3, to 
test our hypothesis that the status salience manipulation would uniquely manipulate status 
awareness and not these two other self-threats. We predicted that the status salience manipulation 
would have a significant main effect on status awareness which would, in turn, predict greater 
attributions to pity and more negative (and less positive) affective reactions to receiving $8. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 194 university students recruited through the psychology department 
participant pool, who received research credit (and $8) for their time. Participants were randomly 
assigned to complete information about their SES either before (SES-salient) or after (SES-not-
salient) receiving money from their partner in a dictator game. To manipulate the perception of 
having lower SES than the confederate, we decided a priori to exclude participants with 
extremely high SES (i.e., whose response on the SES ladder was 8, 9, or 10; n = 4711). We also 
excluded one participant who reported knowing the confederate (SES-not-salient condition) and 
four participants who encountered procedural errors (they either did not receive or did not count 
their money before completing the dependent variables; nSES-salient = 2; nSES-not-salient = 2). This left 
us with a final sample of 142 participants (nSES-salient = 67, nSES-not-salient = 75). The sample was 
76% female, mostly East Asian (58%) and Caucasian (20%), with a mean age of 19.97 (SD = 
2.04). This study was run in 2015 and, based on conventions at that time, we aimed to collect 
200 participants (planning the sample as if there were 4 conditions with 50 per condition, since 
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we were testing for moderation; Simmons et al., 2011). A sensitivity analysis (1 – β = .80, α = 
.05, two-tailed) suggests that our sample of 142 can detect main effects where d >= .47. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was quite similar to that of Study 1. Participants arrived at the lab 
individually along with a female confederate, and completed a biographical sheet. For each 
participant, page one of this sheet included age, gender, major, year in school, and a personality 
measure. Participants who were randomly assigned to the SES-not-salient condition completed 
only this first page, whereas those randomly assigned to the SES-salient condition completed a 
second page that included SES-related questions (their parents’ education and occupation, their 
own preferred activities, their SES relative to other students). The participant then exchanged 
their biographical sheet with the confederate, who also completed either both pages (in the SES-
salient condition), or only the first page (in the SES-not-salient condition). For participants in the 
SES-salient condition, the biographical sheet from their partner suggested someone from a 
relatively higher SES background, as her SES ladder response was always 3 points higher than 
the participant’s own rating. Participants in the SES-not-salient condition eventually completed 
the same SES-related questions after they received the money from the confederate, and after 
completing the main outcome variables.  
After exchanging the biographical sheets, the participant was ostensibly randomly 
assigned to be the receiver in the dictator game. All other procedures were the same as in Study 
1, except that the confederate (who was always female) was instructed to smile when delivering 
the money to the participant (vs. a neutral facial expression in Study 1). This change was made to 
SES AND HELPING  40 
address a concern that a neutral face in this context of handing someone an envelope of money 
might seem unusually negative. 
Measures 
Core measures of perceived relative SES, attribution and affect. The same measures 
were included in this study: relative SES compared to the confederate (on the same item as in 
Study 1; M = 2.50, SD = 0.86); attributions to pity (on the same two items as in Studies 1-3; 
r(142) = .66, p < .001; M = 3.01 , SD = 1.54), generosity (on the same item as in Study 1; M = 
6.06 , SD = 1.08), and fairness (on the same item as in Studies 1-3; M = 4.53, SD = 1.45); 
positive emotions (on the same items as in Studies 1-3; α = .81; M = 3.90, SD = 1.03), and self-
conscious negative emotions (on the same items as in Studies 1-3; α = .83; M =1.89, SD = 0.92). 
Status awareness, perceived competence and belonging. We included measures of 
status awareness (α = .80; M = 4.37, SD = 1.01), perceived competence (α = .80; M = 4.40, SD 
= 0.92), and belonging (α = .76; M = 4.88, SD = 0.95), on the same items used in Study 3.12 
These potential mediators were moderately correlated, .48 < |p’s| < .68. 
Results 
Manipulation Check of Perceived Relative SES 
 Analysis of participants’ ratings of status relative to the confederate revealed the expected 
condition difference, t(89.33) = 7.91, p < .001, d = 1.35.13 Participants felt relatively lower in 
SES compared to the confederate when SES information had been collected and exchanged prior 
to the dictator game (i.e., in the SES-salient condition; M = 1.99, SD = .93) rather than after the 
dictator game (M = 2.96, SD = .42). This finding is not the result of an actual difference between 
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conditions in self-reported SES; there was no condition difference in perceived SES relative to 
other students, t(140) = .58, p = .57, d = .10. 
When relative SES was made salient in advance, participants judged their relative SES to 
be significantly lower than the scale midpoint (3 = about the same), t(66) = -8.94, p < .001, d = 
1.10. However, when participants were not primed to think about their relative SES (and had no 
reason to believe the confederate would know their SES) before they received the money or 
completed any outcomes, they expected their own SES to be the same as that of the confederate 
(comparison to scale midpoint of 3), t(74) = -.83, p = .41, d = .10. Thus, in this paradigm (in 
contrast to Study 1), we were better able to create a control condition where people assumed they 
had equal status to the confederate.  
Manipulation Check of Status Awareness 
As hypothesized, analyses revealed that participants felt significantly more aware of 
status differences between themselves and their partner in the SES-salient condition (M = 4.73, 
SD = .97), than in the SES-not-salient condition (M = 4.04, SD = .93), t(140) = -4.30, p < .001, d 
= .72.  
There was no clear evidence in this study that participants felt lower in perceived 
competence in the SES-salient condition (M = 4.35, SD = .83), compared to the SES-not-salient 
condition (M = 4.46, SD = .99), t(140) = .71, p = .48, d = .12, or lower belonging in the SES-
salient condition (M = 4.77, SD = .97), compared to the SES-not-salient condition (M = 4.98, SD 
= .93), t(140) = 1.28, p = .20, d = .22. These results suggest that we effectively manipulated 
status salience as distinct from these other possible sources of self-threat. Because the 
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manipulation had no significant effect on perceived competence or belonging ratings, they were 
not examined as having potential indirect effects on affective responses.  
Attributions for the Giver’s Behavior 
 Consistent with Study 1 and our central hypothesis, participants in the SES-salient 
condition were significantly more likely to attribute their partner’s generous gift to pity (M = 
3.72, SD = 1.62) compared to those in the SES-not-salient condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.13), 
t(116.53) = -5.72, p < .001, d = .97.14  
There were no significant condition effects on perceptions of the giver’s generosity 
(MSES-salient = 6.09, SDSES-salient = 1.03; MSES-not-salient = 6.04, SDSES-not-salient = 1.13), t(140)= -0.27, p 
= .79, d = .05. However, the $8 gift did seem somewhat more fair in the SES-salient condition 
(M = 4.78, SD = 1.34) than in the SES-not-salient condition (M = 4.31, SD = 1.52), t(140) = -
1.95, p = .05, d = .33, whereas there was no effect of SES condition on fairness in Study 1.  
Affective Responses and Indirect Effects of Attributions on Affective Responses 
 Contrary to our hypotheses, there were no significant direct effects of the manipulation 
on either self-conscious negative affect, t(140) = 0.13, p = .89, d = .02, or positive affect, t(140) 
= 0.24, p = .81, d = .04. The lack of direct effects was surprising given the results in the earlier 
studies and the significant effects found on our mediating variables. However, because indirect 
effects can still be significant and meaningful even in the absence of a significant direct effect, 
we conducted serial mediation analyses similar to those we ran in Study 3. That is, we used 
model 6 in PROCESS to test a path model whereby SES salience (dummy-coded; X) elevates 
status awareness, which in turn predicts attributions to pity (both z-scored; M), and finally 
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affective outcomes (z-scored; Y). Again, to present consistent effects, we carried out parallel 
analyses for both self-conscious negative affect and positive affect. 
Self-conscious affect. The test of the full serial indirect model for self-conscious affect 
was significant, b = .04 (SE = .03), CI95 = [.002, .12] (see Figure 5). More specifically, the 
indirect effect of the status salience manipulation on self-conscious affect via only pity was 
significant, b = .22 (SE = .08), CI95 = [.09, .41] (replicating studies 1-3), but via only status 
awareness was not, b = .11 (SE = .07), CI95 = [-.01, .29]. 
<Insert Figure 5 here> 
Interestingly, with these two mediators in the model, the direct effect of the manipulation 
was significant, b = -.38 (SE = .18), p = .04, CI95 = [-.75, -.02], suggesting that suppressor effects 
might have precluded condition effects on negative affect (more on this below). 
Positive affect. When the same analysis was repeated for positive affect, the serial 
indirect effect was not significant, b = .02 (SE = .02), CI95 = [-.002, .07] (see Figure 6). The 
specific indirect effect of condition on positive affect via status awareness was significant, b = -
.14 (SE = .07), CI95 = [-.31, -.02], but the specific indirect effect via pity was not, b = .09 (SE = 
.07), CI95 = [-.03, .27]. 
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
 Moderation by status salience. The lack of direct effects of the status salience 
manipulation on affective outcomes combined with the suppressor effect in the serial indirect 
model for negative self-conscious affect led us to consider the possibility that measured status 
awareness might only be related to making an attribution to pity, and feeling bad about the 
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money received, if one believed that the giver knew one’s SES before deciding how much to 
give (i.e., in the SES-salient condition). Without this status information, receiving $8 might still 
elicit a negative self-conscious response, but one that has little to do with feeling pitied or having 
lower status. In other words, a moderated mediation pattern could account for the lack of direct 
effect on affective outcomes and for a suppressor effect when controlling for status salience. 
To test this possibility, we used model 7 in PROCESS to test whether the indirect effect 
of status awareness on self-conscious negative affect via pity was significantly stronger for those 
in the status salient (vs. non-salient) condition. This model revealed a significant moderated 
mediation for self-conscious negative affect, b = .09 (SE = .06), CI95 = [.01, .25]. The conditional 
indirect effect of status awareness on self-conscious negative affect via pity was significant in the 
SES-salient condition, b = .08 (SE = .06), CI95 = [.01, .23], but not in the SES-not-salient control 
condition, when participants assumed they had equal status to the giver, b = -.004 (SE = .03), 
CI95 = [-.05, .05]. A parallel analysis for positive affect did not yield evidence of significant 
moderated mediation, b = .05 (SE = .04), CI95 = [-.01, .17]. These results suggest that 
participants in both conditions felt somewhat self-conscious receiving $8 out of $10 from a 
stranger, but these negative emotions were predicted by status salience and attributions to pity 
only for those who were made aware of their SES being lower than the giver’s. 
Meta-Analysis Across Studies 
 The results of these four studies have revealed consistent patterns of relative SES: direct 
effects on attributions to pity (across all four studies); direct effects on status awareness (in 
Studies 3 and 4, which were the only ones to include the measure); indirect effects via pity on 
self-conscious negative affect (all four studies). Tests of direct effects on affective outcomes 
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have been less consistent. In order to estimate the size of these direct effects on affective 
outcomes, we conducted an internal meta-analysis across these four studies (the only studies 
conducted by our lab investigating the effects of SES on targets of generosity), following 
procedures described by Goh, Hall, and Rosenthal (2016). For the purpose of these analyses, we 
focused specifically on the effect of relative SES (as manipulated in Study 1, measured in 
Studies 2 and 3, or made salient in Study 4) on attributions to pity, self-conscious negative affect, 
and positive affect. Across all studies, the relative SES variable was scaled to range from 0 
(equally high SES) to 1 (relatively lower SES). In other words, condition variables in the dictator 
game studies were dummy coded 0 (high-SES in Study 1; SES-not-salient in Study 4) or 1 (low-
SES in Study 1; SES-salient in Study 4), whereas in the recall studies, the 4-point relative SES 
measure was converted to a 0 to 1 scale (with 4, 3, 2, 1 corresponding to values = 0, .333, .666, 
1). 
 To test the direct effects of relative SES on pity, self-conscious negative affect, and 
positive affect, we employed a random-effects model, taking an unweighted mean of effect sizes 
across the four studies. Correlations were converted to d’s (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2009), and then meta-analyzed using Cumming’s (2013) meta-analysis module in the 
Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals (see computations online here: 
https://osf.io/yh7wu/). Results of these analyses yielded significant average effects of relative 
SES on all three variables (see Figure 7). The average estimated effect of relative SES on pity 
was d = .63, CI95 = [.33, .93]. The average effects of relative SES on self-conscious negative 
affect, d = .17, CI95 = [.02, .31], and positive affect were also significant, d = -.20, CI95 = [-.39, -
.02]. Thus, despite the fact that some studies did not yield significant direct effects on affective 
reactions, across this line of research there is evidence that those with lower relative SES feel 
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more pitied and experience more affective costs and fewer affective benefits when receiving 
generous gifts from higher status others.  
<Insert Figure 7 here> 
General Discussion 
 
 Money is society’s clearest metric of value. People generally feel happy both when 
receiving money from others, and when giving money to others. The present set of studies, 
however, reveals important boundary conditions that differentiate when the exchange of money 
(or other gifts of value) has hedonic benefits and when it triggers feelings of negative self-
consciousness. Specifically, when differences in social status are salient, what would otherwise 
be experienced as an interpersonal act of generosity is seen by the recipient as an awkward act of 
pity that dampens the joy of receiving money. These negative emotional consequences are felt 
even when the recipient needs the money or requests it. Such results are consistent with the 
notion that giving across the status divide triggers social identity threat among lower SES 
recipients, similar to concerns found in interactions of majority and minority groups more 
generally (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010). 
  Taken together, these studies yield several novel theoretical insights about the nature of 
prosocial giving across the status divide. The findings reported here integrate prior research on 
the psychological costs of being a target of helping or aid with more contemporary research on 
the hedonic benefits of prosocial giving, and are interpreted within a framework of social identity 
threat. By integrating these quite distinct literatures, the current studies make advances to each.   
In line with a social identity threat view, we found that targets of generosity from higher 
status others become aware of status differences, feel pitied, and experience negative self-
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conscious affect. These effects are somewhat distinct from the way assumptive help has been 
studied in the past. Research in the 1970’s and 80’s aimed to show that receiving help from 
advantaged others lowers a person’s self-esteem by making salient painful upward comparisons 
or eroding a sense of self-efficacy (Fisher et al., 1982; Nadler & Fisher, 1986; Nadler & Halabi, 
2015). Although such effects might be likely when assumptive help is given on a performance 
task that is ego-relevant, we found no clear evidence that the affective consequences measured 
here are better explained by threats to one’s sense of competence or belonging (vs. status 
awareness). The effects in the present studies have less to do with making targets feel bad about 
themselves, but rather highlighting for them the status devaluation they face as someone with 
relatively lower SES. 
In addition, the self-esteem threat perspective on reactions to aid suggests that targets 
would not only feel bad about themselves, but would also evaluate the giver in a more negative 
light (Fisher et al., 1982). Findings from the current studies instead reveal that receiving money 
from someone higher in status is perceived with mixed emotions. Lower SES recipients feel 
badly receiving a generous gift of money from a higher status person who is seen as taking pity 
on them, but they do not seem to hold this against the giver. Instead, they recognize the giver’s 
intentions to be generous and often experience some positive affect as well, even if those positive 
emotions are more muted. Because these episodes are not only experienced in a negative way, 
they constitute subtle forms of identity threat that are attributionally ambiguous. Such 
experiences can take a toll on health and well-being if they accumulate over time (Major & 
Schmader, 2018).  
Together, the current studies also expose how reminders of socioeconomic differences in 
interpersonal interactions might be a cue to social identity threat (Croizet & Millet, 2012; 
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Johnson et al., 2011; Stephens et al., 2012). The fact that relative status was made salient even 
among objectively well-off university students highlights the fundamental ease with which 
perceived status differences can create a divide, and cue social identity threat (Johnson et al., 
2011). Indeed, the expectation of similarity among peers, punctured by a clear signal of the status 
hierarchy, might be integral to the phenomenon studied here (Fisher, Harrison, & Nadler, 1978; 
Fisher & Nadler, 1974; Nadler et al., 1976). In contrast, when differences in status are accepted 
and legitimized, the emotional costs to generosity might be minimized, if not eliminated. 
Because gifts of monetary value are generally positive in nature, the current research also 
highlights that experiences of social identity threat are not limited to objectively negative events. 
Positive experiences can also be a signal of social devaluation, even when the target 
acknowledges that the giver’s behavior might have been well-intentioned. Although research on 
prosocial giving has tended to emphasize the hedonic benefits to givers when they are generous 
to those in need (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2014), the current research suggests that targets 
themselves might have complex reactions to generosity across the status divide. This general 
finding connects to other ways in which members of a disadvantaged minority can feel a sense of 
threat and uncertainty when they are suspicious of the motives of majority group members who 
act positively toward them (Major et al., 2016). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although these studies are unique in examining the affective consequences to receivers 
when giving happens in the context of status differences, there are several limitations to 
acknowledge. First, there were some inconsistencies across the studies: relative SES predicted 
self-conscious negative affect directly in Studies 1 and 2, but not Studies 3 and 4, and positive 
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affect in Studies 1 and 3, but not Studies 2 and 4. However, in all studies we find that individuals 
whose status is lower than the giver’s are more likely (than individuals whose status is more 
equal to the giver’s) to attribute a generous gift to pity, and these feelings of being pitied relate to 
self-conscious negative affect. Because it is not unusual to find a variable pattern of effects 
across a set of studies (Lakens & Etz, 2017), we conducted an internal meta-analysis to better 
estimate the true effect size and found reliable direct effects of relative SES on pity, negative 
self-conscious affect, and positive affect. Thus, despite some inconsistency of specific effects 
across two very different study paradigms, there is a general pattern of support for the broader 
phenomenon we discuss. 
Importantly, the experimental studies did not include participants who were objectively 
very low in socioeconomic status. At an extreme level of economic disadvantage, hedonic 
benefits of receiving aid might be more readily realized; if one is dying of thirst, it is hard to 
imagine that one would feel anything but thrilled at receiving a gift of water. However, results of 
Studies 2 and 3, which provided relatively representative samples of the general population 
(albeit somewhat more educated), suggest that having a clear need does not moderate the 
negative affective experience of receiving a generous gift from a higher status other. Thus, in the 
context of typical acts of generosity, we might expect to observe these acts of giving to elicit 
social identity threat. Theoretically, moderators that implicate status awareness could be 
potentially fruitful avenues for future research. For example, recipients’ identification with their 
social class could yield complex results. On the one hand, class identification could make one 
feel less similar to financial donors of higher SES which might reduce the emotional sting of 
generous gifts. However, a social identity threat approach would suggest that higher 
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identification might increase the salience of status differences in a way that would instead 
magnify effects. 
A key limitation to these findings is our inability to know how long these emotional 
effects might last. In the experimental studies, people reported how they were feeling 
immediately after receiving a gift, providing no information about longer term effects. 
Participants in the recall studies, however, reported how they remembered feeling after receiving 
a gift in the past. Although we did not ask how long ago the gift occurred, some of the 
descriptions did include a timeframe (e.g., “Approximately 15 years ago…”, “A few years 
ago…”, “There was a time many years ago…”), suggesting that the experience of receiving a gift 
can be quite memorable. Prospective longitudinal studies would be needed to map the duration 
of these affective consequences and how they affect other outcomes, such as one’s relationship 
to the giver, or motivation to avoid such gifts in the future.  
The main goal of the current research was to investigate the affective consequences when 
the recipient of a generous gift was lower in SES relative to the giver. Another interesting 
direction for future research might be to investigate the consequences of this phenomenon when 
recipients of gifts are higher in SES relative to the donor. For example, when individuals lower 
in SES provide help or a generous gift to individuals higher in SES, this behavior may be 
perceived by higher SES individuals as an attempt for lower SES individuals to attain parity in 
social standing (i.e., status threat; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As such, individuals higher in SES 
may respond with behaviors to restore their status (e.g., defensive help, Nadler, Harpax-
Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009).  
SES AND HELPING  51 
The studies reported here focus on interpersonal giving. The applicability to intergroup 
contexts or system-level resource distribution is unknown. Prosocial giving to those in need 
frequently involves gifts to charitable organizations that distribute these resources to needy 
individuals. In addition to providing an efficient mechanism for resource distribution, such 
agencies might also launder these monetary resources of their emotional stain. Future studies 
could extend the current paradigms to examine whether the emotional costs of generosity can be 
alleviated by the insertion of a charitable organization or social program that increases the 
psychological distance between the giver and the receiver. Social programs such as welfare and 
unemployment insurance are public programs designed to address income inequality. However, 
to the extent that receiving money from social programs and charities triggers status awareness, 
and thus a sensitivity to being pitied, it might also be important to understand variations to 
programs that mitigate these effects. A social identity threat approach might support the premise 
that non-paternalistic helping that provides recipients with more spending choice or opportunities 
for reciprocity (e.g., through community service) might have more positive emotional 
consequences (Schroeder et al., 2017).  
Conclusions 
 In sum, the current set of studies investigated the affective consequences for the receiver 
in a status-salient personal giving context. Taken together, these studies suggest that when 
recipients of generosity feel relatively lower in SES than the giver, they feel pitied and 
experience more self-conscious negative affect in response. These emotional costs might be a 
limiting factor for acts of generosity directed toward those who would benefit the most. 
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Footnotes 
1 Because there are no clear and consensually held socio-economic categories, we focus on the 
experience of individuals who feel they are being judged through the lens of their perceived SES. 
It would be an interesting, but separate question, to examine predictions stemming from the 
intergroup helping as status relations model (Nadler, 2002), where acts of generosity from upper 
class groups to lower class groups could be seen as trying to pacify or disempower the lower 
class in society. 
2 Study 1 combined samples from two experiments using similar paradigms that yielded 
strikingly consistent results. The studies differed in some characteristics of the samples, the 
operationalization of relative SES, and one design element added to the second sample. See 
Supplementary Online Materials (SOM) for more details. 
3 We also included an attribution to the giver’s goodwill (She is nice, She was in a good mood, 
She likes me; α = .73). Because this measure was far less reliable in Study 2, we did not include 
it in Study 3, and thus only discuss this measure in the SOM. To provide more consistency 
across studies, we instead present participants’ ratings of the giver’s generosity, in order to assess 
the degree to which participants simply interpret the giver’s behavior at face value: as an act of 
generosity. 
4 This was true in both samples despite the fact that in Sample 1b, we matched the giver’s SES 
on the relative SES ladder measure directly to the participant’s own response. 
5 In this and all studies, we also carried out supplemental tests of reverse mediation: perhaps 
people first have an affective response to the gift that then predicts, for example, their attribution 
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to pity. There was less consistent evidence across the four studies for this reverse mediation. See 
SOM. 
6 A total of 88 participants (out of 565) did not complete the survey: 7 stopped before providing 
consent, 16 stopped after providing consent, but without providing any additional information; 
65 stopped after providing partial information. Of the 114 participants (out of 477) who were 
unable to recall an experience of receiving a gift of the type we described, 90 participants said 
they couldn’t recall such an experience, and 24 participants provided responses that did not 
conform to our specifications regarding the type of gift: 5 did not provide a description of the 
gift, 7 were examples of giving rather than receiving, 1 was a gift given to an individual on 
behalf of an organization/charity they represented, 2 were gifts received by someone else, 3 
described impersonal gifts (draw prizes/contests), 3 described gifts with no monetary value (a 
place to stay, a dog, a ride), and 3 descriptions were incoherent. These exclusions were made 
prior to data analysis. 
7 Self-conscious negative affect was the one analysis that revealed a significant relative SES by 
monetary value interaction, b = -.16 (SE = .07), CI95 = [-.30, -.02]. Simple slopes analyses 
revealed that when the gift was of higher perceived value (+1 SD), having lower SES relative to 
the giver was associated with feeling more self-conscious NA, b = -.34 (SE = .11), CI95 = [-.55, -
.13], but when the gift was of lower perceived value (-1 SD), relative SES was not associated 
with self-conscious NA, b = -.01 (SE = .10), CI95 = [-.20, .18]. 
8 The recruitment total of 1007 does not include 107 non-American participants (who were 
inadvertently able to complete the survey due to an error when setting up the MTurk study). Of 
the total 1007, 346 participants did not complete the survey and thus were excluded from 
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analyses: 142 stopped before providing consent, 90 stopped after providing consent, but without 
providing any additional information, 114 stopped after providing partial information. An 
additional 20 responses were duplicates (based on IP address, gender, and age), resulting in 641 
complete, non-duplicate responses. After data were collected on the first 629 participants, events 
were coded to identify the percentage of valid giving experiences so that we could estimate how 
many more participants would need to be recruited to approximate our desired sample size. Of 
the 153 participants who were unable to recall an experience of receiving a gift of the type we 
described, 146 participants said they could not recall such an experience, and 7 participants 
provided responses that did not conform to our specifications regarding the type of gift: 1 did not 
provide a description of the gift, 1 was an example of giving rather than receiving, 2 were gifts 
given to an individual on behalf of an organization/charity they represented, 1 described an 
impersonal gift (a draw prize), and 2 descriptions were incoherent. All exclusions were made 
prior to data analysis.  
9 An additional item (“inferior: superior”), originally intended to assess status awareness, 
correlated negatively with the other items on this scale, and thus was not included in the status 
awareness composite.  
10 In exploratory analyses testing monetary value as a predictor rather than as a covariate, it also 
moderated this effect resulting in a significant relative SES x money x closeness interaction. 
Relative SES had a stronger positive relationship with positive affect when people received a 
low-cost gift (-1 SD) from a close other (+1 SD), b = .36, (SE = .11), CI95 = [.14, .57], rather than 
a distant other (-1 SD), b = -.02 (SE = .08), CI95 = [-.19, .14]. When the gift was worth more 
money (+1 SD), the relationship between relative SES and positive affect was weak but positive 
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(though non-significant) regardless of whether the giver was close, b = .16 (SE = .10), CI95 = [-
.03, .34], or distant, β = .17 (SE = .11), CI95 = [-.04, .38]. 
11 Although this is a sizeable percentage of the sample (24%), the percentage with these high 
SES scores did not vary by condition (nSES-salient = 22, nSES-not-salient = 25) and was similar to the 
22% of participants in sample 1b of Study 1 who rated their SES as 8 or higher. 
12 Unlike in Study 3, all four status awareness items formed a reliable measure, and were 
averaged together.  
13 The degrees of freedom were adjusted because there was significantly higher variation in this 
attribution within the SES-salient condition compared to the SES-not-salient condition, F(140) = 
20.50, p < .001. 
14 The degrees of freedom were adjusted because there was significantly higher variation in this 
attribution within the SES-salient condition compared to the SES-not-salient condition, F(140) = 
15.69, p < .001. 
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Table 1. Means (Standard deviations) and ANOVA results for Study 1. 
Variable Means (SD) F test from ANOVA (
) 
 $8, low 
relative SES 
n = 62 
$5, low 
relative SES 
n = 41 
$8, high 
relative SES 
n = 51 
$5, high 
relative SES 
n = 64 
Main Effect 
$ 
Main effect 
relative SES 
Interaction: 
$ x relative 
SES 
Giver attributions        
   Pity 4.33 (1.49) 2.13 (1.19) 2.92 (1.35) 1.63 (.88) 102.31*** 
(.33) 
30.78*** 
(.13) 
6.80* 
(.03) 
   Generosity 6.13 (.93) 5.10 (1.51) 6.24 (.79) 5.27 (1.21) 42.18*** 
(.17) 
0.79  
(.004) 
0.04 
(.001) 
   Fairness 5.02 (1.47) 6.73 (.74) 4.69 (1.63) 6.57 (.98) 104.93*** 
(.33) 
1.95 
(.01) 
0.23 
(.001) 
Affective response to receiving money     
   Negative self-      
   conscious affect 
2.14 (.98) 1.40 (.63) 1.98 (.84) 1.16 (.34) 58.44*** 
(.22) 
3.89* 
(.02) 
0.17 
(.001) 
   Positive affect 3.82 (1.12) 4.23 (1.25) 4.42 (1.09) 4.67 (1.24) 4.27* 
(.02) 
10.36** 
(.05) 
0.25 
(.001) 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2. Means (SDs) and bivariate correlations between measures of interest for Study 2. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Relative SES - -.25*** -.14** -.11* .09 -.10 .03 
2. Money (log-
transformed) 
 - .05 .13* -.10 -.05 .11* 
3. Pity   - .09  .17** .39*** -.23*** 
4. Generous    - .01 -.02 .16** 
5. Fairness     - .09 .11* 
6. Self-conscious 
Negative Affect 
     - -.45*** 
7. Positive Affect       - 
M 2.17 2.22 4.34 6.29 4.02 1.99 4.55 
SD 1.09 .96 1.91 1.16 2.04 1.28 1.28 
Reliability n/a n/a r(328) = .55, 
p < .001 
n/a n/a α = .93 α = .85 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 3. Means (SDs) and bivariate correlations between measures of interest for Study 3. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Relative SES - -.18*** -.23*** -.06 .06 -.07 .13** -.24*** .20*** .13** 
2. Money (log-
transformed) 
 - .16** -.01 .06 .02 .12* .01 .09 .01 
3. Pity   - .003 .23*** .33*** -.19*** .20*** -.14** -.08 
4. Generous    - .13** -.17** .36*** .04 .20*** .43*** 
5. Fairness     - .05 .15** -.001 .16** .12* 
6. Self-conscious 
Negative Affect 
     - -.47*** .34*** -.37*** -.32*** 
7. Positive Affect       - -.24*** .57*** .54*** 
8. Status 
Awareness 
       - -.41*** -.34*** 
9. Competence         - .72*** 
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10. Belonging          - 
M 2.63 1.98 4.09 6.36 4.10 2.05 5.02 4.37 4.82 5.64 
SD 1.18 .83 2.06 1.03 2.00 1.25 1.23 0.94 1.19 1.17 
Reliability n/a n/a r(423) = .62, 
p < .001 
n/a n/a .92 .87 .57 .86 .87 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Moderated mediation results for self-conscious affect in Study 1. Standardized 
coefficients (β) are presented. β in parentheses is the direct effect with mediators in the 
model. Only the indirect effect via pity was significant and was moderated by relative 
SES. 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 2. Moderated mediation results for positive affect in Study 1. Standardized 
coefficients (β) are presented. β in parentheses is the direct effect with mediators in the 
model. Only the moderated mediation via pity was significant. 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 3. PROCESS results for test of serial mediation on self-conscious negative affect 
in Study 3. Standardized coefficients (β) are presented. β in parentheses is the direct 
effect with mediators in the model. Monetary value, perceived competence, and 
belonging were entered in the model as covariates.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 4. PROCESS results for test of serial mediation on positive affect in Study 3. 
Standardized coefficients (β) are presented. β in parentheses is the direct effect with 
mediators in the model. Monetary value, perceived competence, and belonging were 
entered in the model as covariates.  
** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 5. PROCESS results for test of serial mediation on self-conscious negative affect 
in Study 4. Standardized coefficients (β) are presented. β in parentheses is the direct 
effect with mediators in the model.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 6. PROCESS results for test of serial mediation on positive affect in Study 4. 
Standardized coefficients (β) are presented. β in parentheses is the direct effect with 
mediators in the model.  
* p < .05, *** p < .001 
SES AND HELPING  75 
Figure 7. Internal meta-analysis for direct effect of relative SES on pity, self-conscious negative affect, and positive affect when receiving a 
generous gift. 
   
 
 
1 
 
Supplementary Materials  
 Here we report additional details about the methods and results of each of the 
studies reported in the manuscript. These details were not included either because they 
were tangential to our specific research questions or because supplementary analyses did 
not contribute any additional information relevant to tests of hypotheses. Materials, data 
sets and analysis scripts for all studies are available online: https://osf.io/yh7wu/. 
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants: Differences Between Samples 1a and 1b 
Study 1 of the manuscript represents two separate samples which, for the sake of 
parsimony and increased statistical power, were combined. In Sample 1a, we recruited 
only female students, and employed only female research assistants to ensure that status 
differentials between males and females did not confound the results. In order to increase 
our pool of participants, we eliminated this restriction when we collected Sample 1b. 
In Sample 1a, students were eligible to participate in the study only if they had 
rated themselves as either low (1 through 4) or high (8 through 10) in SES relative to 
other undergraduate students at the same university, on a pre-screening questionnaire at 
the beginning of the semester (though, when they answered the same question in the lab, 
we classified participants who rated themselves from 1 through 6 as low-SES, and 
participants who rated themselves from 7 through 10 as high-SES). In contrast, in Sample 
1b all students were eligible to participate, and in both samples their SES responses 
(relative to other undergraduate students at the same university) within the study session 
were used to determine their assignment to the low-SES or high-SES condition. Indeed, 
Sample 1b was collected in part to provide a more precise manipulation of lower vs. 
similar SES after the results of Sample 1a revealed that all participants felt somewhat 
lower in SES than the confederate. 
Procedure: Differences Between Samples 1a and 1b 
In Sample 1a, the confederate (always female in Sample 1a, but not in Sample 1b) 
always indicated on the biographical sheet that they would fall on the 9th rung of the SES 
ladder (relative to other undergraduate students at the same university); we reasoned that 
4 
 
the low-SES participants would see the confederate as higher in SES than them, and the 
high-SES participants would see the confederate as having an SES similar to their own. 
In Sample 1b, the experimenter surreptitiously filled in the confederate’s SES to yoke 
that response to the one provided by the participant. If the participant rated themselves as 
being of lower SES (6 or lower), the experimenter indicated that the confederate’s SES 
was three points higher than that of the participant. However, if the participant rated 
themselves as high SES (7 or higher), the experimenter indicated that the confederate’s 
SES was the same as that of the participant. 
Initially, the study with Sample 1b was designed to also examine whether the 
giver’s motivation for giving would moderate receivers’ responses. The design included 
an additional manipulation of the confederate’s (giver’s) agentic or communal 
orientation, conveyed through additional responses on the biographical sheet. We had 
hypothesized that a low SES participant might feel less threatened receiving $8 from a 
high SES partner who is communally rather than agentically motivated. However, initial 
analyses of our manipulation checks revealed that participants did not view the 
confederate who gave a communal response as being more communally motivated, t(102) 
= .30, p = .76, though they did view the communal confederate as more concerned with 
others, t(101) = 2.00, p = .05. Given that this manipulation failed to adequately shift 
participants’ views of the confederate’s motives, and did not moderate effects on key 
outcome variables, we collapsed across the agentic and communal conditions in all of the 
reported analyses. 
SES manipulation 
Participants were asked to report their father’s and mother’s education (“end of 
primary school”, “end of junior high school”, “end of high school”, “some 
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college/university”, “college/university graduate”, “post-graduate study”), and 
occupation. They also reported whether or not they had a job while going to school, and 
how often they engaged in several expensive activities (“go to the movies”, “go out to 
eat”, “go skiing/snowboarding”, “go to amusement parks”, “go shopping (other than for 
groceries)”, “travel for pleasure”). 
Additional Measures 
Given that the following measures were not of focal interest, and either exhibited 
no change as a result of the manipulation or exhibited inconsistent patterns across 
samples, we omit further mention of them here. Please contact one of the first authors for 
more details. 
Attributions for the giver’s behavior. In addition to the three items assessing 
attributions to pity and fairness, there were items (on the same 7-point scale) assessing 
the extent to which: the giver did not need the money, the gift was due to the giver’s good 
mood, the giver was biased against the receiver, the giver was greedy, the giver was nice, 
the giver liked the receiver. 
Affective responses. In addition to measuring self-conscious negative emotions 
after receiving money, we measured sad (depressed, sad, hurt, upset, disappointed), 
angry (angry, offended), and anxious negative affect (nervous, anxious) after receiving 
the money. We also measured trait affect before the task, on a baseline information sheet 
(Diener et al., 2010). 
 
Partner perceptions. We measured participants’ ratings of their partner on a set 
of positive (friendly in Samples 1a and 1b, trustworthy and thoughtful in Sample 1a, fair-
minded in Sample 1b) and negative (arrogant and phony in Samples 1a and 1b, 
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patronizing in Sample 1b) traits. We measured participants’ ratings of the extent to which 
they liked, felt connected to, similar to, close to (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992), and 
warm towards their partner.  
Self-esteem, self-evaluation and reciprocation motives. We measured trait self-
esteem before the task, on a baseline information sheet (Rosenberg, 1979), and state 
social self-esteem after the task (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). We asked participants how 
they compared to others (in general) with respect to intelligence, success, and in general 
(self-evaluation; Nadler, Fisher, & Ben-Itzhak, 1983). Finally, we measured willingness 
to donate to charity in the future.  
Results 
Self-Esteem and Self-Evaluation 
Given that prior research on assumptive help has often analyzed effects on self-
esteem, we present the results of analyses on state self-esteem here. A 2 (SES: low-SES 
vs. high-SES) x 2 (money: $5 vs. $8) ANOVA on state self-esteem in the combined 
sample for Study 1 yielded a significant main effect of SES condition; people in the low-
SES condition reported lower state self-esteem (M = 5.01, SD = 1.29) than people in the 
high-SES condition (M = 5.46, SD = 1.30), F(1, 214) = 5.25, p = .02, partial η2 = .02. 
However, there were no significant effects on state self-esteem, ps > .05, when the 
analysis was repeated controlling for trait self-esteem, which was measured at the start of 
the study.  
The same 2 x 2 ANOVA on self-evaluation yielded a significant main effect of 
SES condition that was qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 214) = 8.10, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .04. Simple main effect analyses revealed that when people received the more 
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generous $8 gift, there was no difference in self-evaluations between participants in the 
low-SES condition (M = 4.99, SD = 0.77) and participants in the high-SES condition (M 
= 5.05, SD = 0.73), p = .69, partial η2 = .001. However, when participants received the 
even split of $5, participants in the low-SES condition reported lower self-evaluations (M 
= 4.66, SD = 0.87) than did participants in the high-SES condition (M = 5.34, SD = 0.83), 
p < .001, partial η2 = .08. This pattern does not align with what might be predicted from 
past work on assumptive help. 
Testing Reverse Mediation: Predictor → Affect → Mediator 
 In the main text, we report tests of an indirect effect of SES condition on affect 
via various proposed/possible mediators (attributions to pity, generosity, and fairness in 
all studies; status awareness and self-evaluations in Studies 3 and 4). However, the affect-
as-information approach might suggest that the indirect effect could go the other 
direction. When we ran these reverse mediation analyses for this and the other three 
studies, the indirect effect was sometimes significant, but there was less consistency than 
in the analyses that tested our proposed causal model (see Table S1 for results from all 
four studies).  
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Table S1. Summary of results of mediation (indirect effects on negative and positive affect (NA and PA) via attributions, status awareness 
and self-evaluations), and reverse mediation (indirect effects on proposed mediators via affect) 
  Reported indirect effect: b (SE) 
Predictor → mediator → affect 
Reverse mediation: b (SE) 
Predictor → affect → mediator 
Study Affect Pity Generosity Fair Status 
aware 
Competence Belonging Pity Generosity Fair Status 
aware 
Competence Belonging 
1 NA .08 (.03)* -.001 (.01) .03 (.03) - - - .06 (.02)* -.01 (.02) -.02 
(.02) 
- - - 
 PA -.08 
(.03)* 
.13 (.03)* -.07 
(.03)* 
- - - .02 (.01)* -.05 (.02)* -.02 
(.01)* 
- - - 
2 NA -.06 
(.03)* 
n/a n/a - - - -.05 
(.02)* 
n/a n/a - - - 
 PA .03 (.02)* n/a n/a - - - -.02 (.01) n/a n/a - - - 
3 NA -.06 
(.02)* 
n/a n/a -.05 
(.02)* 
-.04 (.02)* -.01 (.01) -.02 (.02) n/a n/a -.02 
(.02) 
.02 (.02) .02 (.02) 
 PA .03 (.01)* n/a n/a -.01 
(.01) 
.07 (.02)* .04 (.02)* -.03 
(.01)* 
n/a n/a -.03 
(.01)* 
.87 (.03)* .08 (.03)* 
4 NA .25 (.10)* n/a .001 
(.03) 
.11 
(.08) 
n/a n/a -.01 (.04) n/a -.001 
(.01) 
-.004 
(.03) 
n/a n/a 
 PA .10 (.08) n/a .06 
(.04)* 
-.13 
(.07)* 
n/a n/a -.003 
(.02) 
n/a -.01 
(.04) 
.01 
(.03) 
n/a n/a 
Note. Effects that are significant at .05 are indicated with an asterisk and marked in bold. n/a = not significant on its own, so not tested in 
mediation; missing = measure not included in the study. For Study 1, we describe the results of simultaneous mediation on the left – not the 
moderated simultaneous mediation reported in the text; money was used as the sole predictor. For Studies 3 and 4, we describe the results of 
simultaneous mediation on the left – not the serial mediation reported in the text. 
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Study 2 
Method 
Participants: Representativeness 
 The participants in this study were fairly representative of national averages in 
terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and income, as determined from the U.S. census (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2013; see Table S2). The study participants were, however, 
more educated than national averages. 
Table S2. Comparison of means of demographic information for participants in Studies 2 
and 3 vs. estimated 2013 U.S. national averages (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013) 
Demographic variable Study 2  
Final Sample  
Study 3 
Final Sample 
2013  
Census Estimate 
Age 34.1 34.8 37.5 
Gender - % female 55 59 50.8 
Ethnicity - % White 79 72 73.7 
Education - % with at 
least some post-
secondary 
92 91 58.8 
Income $49,213 $31,000 - 
$40,999 
$52,250 
 
Procedure: Instructions 
 Participants read the following instructions: 
In this study, we are interested in situations where someone gives money 
or some other generous gift or donation to someone else with no 
expectation that the recipient will reciprocate. Some examples might 
include: 
- A friend offers to pay for a movie ticket for another friend who worries 
that they couldn’t really afford the expense. 
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- A family receives a gift basket or food donation during the holidays from 
a local charitable organization. 
- A person asks a stranger for $2 for bus fare, and is given $20 and told to 
keep the change. 
Can you think of an occasion when you personally received a generous 
gift or charitable donation? 
Measures: Changes from Study 1 
Attributions for the giver’s behavior. We dropped the items assessing the extent 
to which the giver was biased against the receiver, and the giver was greedy. We added 
an item assessing the extent to which the giver was just doing what the receiver had 
asked. This item was considered filler and was not analyzed. 
Affective responses. We added one adjective to the list from Study 1: grateful. 
Moderators. Participants indicated whether the gift was given to them in person 
(“directly and in person”, n = 226), or indirectly from either a person or group (sum of: 
“indirectly through the mail or another third party, but from an individual”, n = 62; “from 
a charitable organization or group (i.e., not from an individual)”, n = 20; “Other”, n = 23).  
Participants indicated whether their relationship to the giver was friend/family 
(sum of: friend(s), n = 99; family member(s), n = 106), or acquaintance/stranger/ 
group/organization (sum of: acquaintance(s), n = 27; stranger(s), n = 46; group I am a 
member of, n = 18; group or organization I have no affiliation with, n = 15; Other, n = 
20). 
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We also asked participants how much they liked the giver and how similar their 
personality was to that of the giver.  
Demographic variables. We asked participants to rate their political orientation. 
Results 
Detailed Results for Attributions  
Attributions to generosity were not predicted by relative SES, b = -.11 (SE = .07), 
t(315) = 1.72, p = .09, CI95 = [-.25, .02]. Monetary value was a significant covariate, b = 
.15 (SE = .07), t(316) = 2.25, p = .03, CI95 = [.02, .27]. 
Attributions to fairness were not predicted by relative SES, b = .16 (SE = .12), 
t(315) = 1.34, p = .18, CI95 = [-.07, .38]. Monetary value was not a significant covariate, 
b = -.21 (SE = .11), t(316) = -1.85, p = .07, CI95 = [-.43, .01]. 
See Table S3 for results of analyses that do not use monetary value as a covariate. 
Table S3. Main effects without using monetary value as a covariate, in Studies 2 and 3. 
Variable Regression results (b’s) 
 Study 2 Study 3 
Giver attributions   
   Pity -.28** -.47*** 
   Generosity -.13* -.06 
   Fairness .19 .13 
Affective response to receiving money 
   Negative self-      
   conscious affect 
-.12 -.08 
   Positive affect .04 .16** 
Possible mediators   
   Status awareness n/a -.23*** 
   Competence n/a .23*** 
   Belonging n/a .15** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Detailed Results for Tests of Moderation 
In the main paper we summarize the results of exploratory analyses testing 
whether the effect of relative SES on affective responses is moderated by different 
aspects of the giving situation. Analyses showed no evidence that effects of relative SES 
on either affect measure were moderated by any of the variables tested. There were, 
however, main effects of some of these variables: people reported more self-conscious 
NA when they were male (vs. female), when they requested the money vs. not, and when 
they had greater need (see Table S4). People reported more PA when they were more 
similar to the giver. 
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Table S4. Standardized regression coefficients from analyses testing possible moderators of affective responses in Study 2. 
 Regression results (b’s) Conditional main effect 
of relative SES on affect 
 
Level of moderator 
 Moderator Relative SES 
x Moderator 
Money 
(Covariate) 
0/Low 1/High 
Self-Conscious Negative Affect      
   Participant Gender (0 = male; 1 = female) -.30** -.001 -.06 -.13 -.14 
   Gift type (0=non-monetary; 1=monetary, non-specific) -.06 -.16 -.07 -.02 -.18 
   In-person (1 = yes, 0 = no) .07 .14 -.08 -.21* -.07 
   Relationship (1 = friend/family, 0 = other) .18 -.14 -.10 -.04 -.18* 
   Requested (1 = yes, 0 = no) .50* .09 -.10 -.12* -.03 
   Expected (1 = yes; 0 = no) .13 -.09 -.09 -.09 -.18* 
For expected gifts, degree to which met expectations .16 -.16 -.05 .01 -.28* 
   Similarity -.02 -.01 -.08 -.11 -.13 
   Need .17** -.05 -.12* -.05 -.16 
Positive Affect      
   Participant Gender (0 = male; 1 = female) .20 .10 .11 .02 .12 
   Gift type (0=non-monetary; 1=monetary, non-specific) -.08 .26 .15* -.12 .14 
   In-person (1 = yes, 0 = no) .13 -.20 .15* .21* .002 
   Relationship (1 = friend/family, 0 = other) -.17 .16 .15* -.02 .14 
   Requested (1 = yes, 0 = no) -.03 .08 .13* .07 .15 
   Expected (1 = yes; 0 = no) .13 -.03 .13* .09 .06 
For expected gifts, degree to which met expectations -.14 .11 .11 -.08 .12 
   Similarity .14* .06 .12* -.001 .11 
   Need -.06 .06 .15* .02 .13 
** p < .01, * p < .05
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Study 3 
Method 
Participants: Representativeness 
 The demographics of the participants were very similar to those of Study 2. 
Participants (59% female) were predominantly White (72%) adults (Mage = 34.77, SD = 
12.18) with at least some post-secondary education (91%). They considered themselves 
somewhat below average with respect to socioeconomic advantages (M = 4.76, SD = 
1.71) and more than 50% of the sample reported an average household income less than 
$41,000. Consistent with this, 66% of the sample identified with being “Lower middle 
class” or lower, though the mode (28%) was “Middle class”. As in Study 2, this sample is 
fairly representative of national averages in all respects except education (see Table S2). 
Procedure: Instructions 
 Participants read the following instructions, which differed slightly from those 
used in Study 2: 
In this study, we are interested in situations where someone gives money 
or some other generous gift to someone else with no expectation that the 
recipient will reciprocate. Some examples might include: 
- A friend offers to pay for a movie ticket for another friend who worries 
that they couldn’t really afford the expense. 
- A family receives a gift basket during the holidays from a neighbor. 
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- A person asks a stranger for $2 for bus fare, and is given $20 and told to 
keep the change. 
Can you think of an occasion when you personally received a generous 
gift from someone who was NOT a member of your immediate family (e.g., 
your parent or grandparent)? 
Measures: Changes from Study 2 
Attributions for the giver’s behavior. We removed any attributions that had 
been included in Studies 1 and 2 but were not of focal interest, except for “He/she 
expected that I would pay them back or reciprocate”. This acted as a check on our 
instructions to think about a gift that did not involve expectations of reciprocation. As in 
Study 2, the very low ratings on this item suggest that participants were recalling 
appropriate gifts with no expectation of reciprocation (M = 1.69, SD = 1.29). 
Affective responses. We removed the sad and anxious negative emotions to 
shorten the list. 
Mediators. An additional semantic differential was not examined: “different than 
this person: similar to this person”.  
Moderators. We removed the items measuring whether the gift was given 
directly or indirectly, and the extent to which the value of the gift compared to 
expectations. 
We included four new variables to explore as possible moderators: stigma 
consciousness, threat of misclassification, belief in meritocracy, and status legitimacy. 
Exploratory analyses examined whether people would feel more self-conscious in 
response to receiving a gift when they were more conscious of being stigmatized, more 
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worried about being judged as having lower SES, or had stronger beliefs in meritocracy 
and status legitimacy. The results of these exploratory analyses were not consistent 
and/or not theoretically sensible, thus we do not include them here. 
Other measures. Participants reported how certain they were about the value of 
the gift, and reported their political orientation. 
Results 
Detailed Results for Attributions  
Attributions to generosity were not predicted by relative SES, b = -.07 (SE = .05), 
t(421) = -1.32, p = .19, CI95 = [-.17, .03]. Monetary value was not a significant covariate, 
b = -.01 (SE = .05), t(422) = -0.12, p = .90, CI95 = [-.11, .09]. 
Attributions to fairness were not predicted by relative SES, b = .15 (SE = .10), 
t(421) = 1.55, p = .12, CI95 = [-.04, .35]. Monetary value was not a significant covariate, 
b = .12 (SE = .10), t(423) = 1.24, p = .22, CI95 = [-.07, .31]. 
See Table S3 for results of analyses that do not use monetary value as a covariate. 
Detailed Results for Tests of Moderation 
As in Study 2, we carried out exploratory analyses testing whether the effects of 
relative SES on affective outcomes were moderated by characteristics of the giving 
situation. Detailed results of these analyses are provided in Table S5. As in Study 2, there 
were some main effects of the potential moderator variables: people reported more self-
conscious NA when they were male (vs. female), and when they had greater need. 
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Women reported more positive affect than men. People reported more positive affect 
when they reported feeling closer to or more similar to the gift-giver.
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Table S5. Standardized regression coefficients from analyses testing possible moderators of affective responses in Study 3. 
 Regression results (b’s) Conditional main effect 
of relative SES on affect 
 
Level of moderator 
 Moderator Relative SES 
x Moderator 
Money 
(Covariate) 
0/Low 1/High 
Self-Conscious Negative Affect      
   Participant Gender (0 = male; 1 = female) -.27** -.07 .01 -.04 -.11 
   Gift type (0=non-monetary; 1=monetary, non-specific) .04 .06 .004 -.10* .002 
   Relationship (0 = other, 1 = friends/family) .01 -.04 .003 -.05 -.09 
   Closeness .02 .01 .002 -.09 -.07 
   Similarity -.01 -.09 .002 .02 -.17* 
   Requested (0 = no, 1 = yes) .38 -.21 -.01 -.06 -.28 
   Need .20*** .03 -.05 -.08 -.02 
Positive Affect      
   Participant Gender (0 = male; 1 = female) .30** .10 .14** .11 .21*** 
   Gift type (0=non-monetary; 1=monetary, non-specific) -.07 -.07 .15** .19** .07 
   Relationship (0 = other, 1 = friends/family) .02 .07 .15** .12 .19** 
   Closeness .11* .09 .13* .05 .24*** 
   Similarity .17** .12* .15** -.002 .23*** 
   Requested (0 = no, 1 = yes) -.16 .23 .15** .14** .38 
   Need -.01 .02 .15** .13 .17* 
*** p < .001,** p < .01, * p < .05  
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Study 4 
Method 
Procedure: Differences Compared to Study 1 
Unlike in Study 1, there was no baseline information sheet, therefore no measures 
of trait self-esteem or baseline affect. 
Measures: Changes from Study 1 
 
Affective responses. We added one adjective that was not included in Study 1: 
grateful.  
Moderators. As in Study 3, we included the same measures of stigma 
consciousness, threat of misclassification, belief in meritocracy, and status legitimacy. 
We also included a new four-item, face-valid measure of financial need (“I have to watch 
what I spend money on so that I can make ends meet”, “I worry about having enough 
money to pay for basic expenses”, “I avoid going out with friends because I think it will 
cost too much”, “I have the money I need to cover my living expenses and tuition fees”), 
assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Partner perceptions. We measured participants’ ratings of their partner on a set 
of positive (friendly, trustworthy, thoughtful, fair-minded) and negative (arrogant, phony, 
patronizing) traits. However, we dropped the measures of feeling connected to, similar to, 
close to, and warm towards their partner that were included in Study 1. 
Working memory. We added an exploratory memory updating task. This task 
measures working memory similar to more traditional working memory tasks (Riediger, 
Wrzus, Schmiedek, Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2011). During this task, participants were 
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given 6.5 seconds to memorize four base numbers, presented in four adjacent boxes on 
the computer screen. Then they were required to perform five sequential arithmetic 
operations (adding/subtracting new numbers to/from the base numbers), and finally 
report the results (four separate final answers). The working memory task contained an 
initial practice trial, followed by ten test trials, half of which were moderately difficult 
(single digit arithmetic), and the other half of which were hard (double-digit arithmetic). 
No effects were found on this measure. 
Other measures. The following measures that were included in Study 1 were 
dropped from Study 4: state social self-esteem; social comparison; willingness to donate 
to charity in the future. 
Results 
Tests of Moderation 
There was no evidence that affective reactions to the money were moderated by 
financial need. Regression analyses predicting affective responses from status salience, 
need (z-scored), and their interaction found no interaction effects on either self-conscious 
negative emotions, b = -.08 (SE = .16), t(138) = -.54, p = .59, or positive emotions, b = -
.13 (SE = .17), t(138) = -.74, p = .46. 
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